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Articles 
Rethinking the Role of the Written Description 
Requirement in Claim Construction: 
Whatever Happened to “Possession is Nine-Tenths 
of the Law?” 
Douglas R. Nemec* & Emily J. Zelenock** 
INTRODUCTION 
Patent law, once regarded as an arcane discipline relevant 
only to direct participants in the patent system – namely, 
patent lawyers and agents, inventors and owners, the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), and the courts – 
has recently captured the attention and interest of the public.  
In the past few years, patent law has become headline news, 
accompanied by an increased public perception that overly 
broad patents are being granted by the PTO and unjustly 
enforced against companies that have commercialized valuable 
products and services, thereby stifling innovation and harming 
consumers.1 
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The dramatic and unprecedented technological revolution 
of the past decade may be largely responsible for the 
heightened public awareness of patents and their potential 
impact on the public.  Since the mid-1990s, the Internet has 
risen from its nascent stages and completely altered the 
manner, process, and scope of doing business.  The technology 
boom has caused a spike in the overall number of Internet-
related patent applications filed with the PTO, particularly 
applications that cover business methods or software.2  Several 
** Emily J. Zelenock is an Intellectual Property and Technology associate in 
the New York office of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP.  Ms. 
Zelenock concentrates her practice on patent litigation and related counseling.  
Ms. Zelenock has served as counsel for both plaintiffs and defendants in 
matters involving various technologies, including medical devices, chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals, computer software, telecommunications, mechanical devices, 
and business methods.  Ms. Zelenock has represented clients during various 
phases of litigation in state and federal court, and has been involved in cases 
that have settled through litigation and the processes of alternative dispute 
resolution. 
 1. In some instances, “madcap patents, such as patents for “protecting a 
method of painting by dipping a baby’s bottom into paint or a system for 
keeping track of people queuing for the bathroom” have grabbed headlines.  
See, e.g., Maggie Shiels, Technology Industry Hits Out at Patent ‘Trolls’, BBC 
News (June, 2, 2004) (discussing the Federal Trade Commission’s view that 
“[s]uch patents, while humorous, clearly show both how broken the American 
patent system and how lax standards are hurting innovation when it comes to 
business[.]”).  In other instances, patent litigations involving widely used 
products or services have grabbed the public’s attention because of the concern 
that a finding of infringement in such cases will affect consumers who use 
such products or services.  See infra notes 3 and 4 (discussing the recent 
litigations involving eBay and Blackberry services).  Moreover, patent law has 
received national attention due to recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Microsoft, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 2007 U.S. LEXIS 4744 (April 30, 2007) 
(reversing the Federal Circuit and holding that 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) does not 
extend to foreign duplication of software); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 2007 
U.S. LEXIS 4745 (April 30, 2007) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s “teaching-
suggestion-motivation” test for determining when a patent is invalid for 
obviousness because it was too narrow and rigid); MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (Jan. 19, 2007) (holding that a patent licensee 
is not required, insofar as U.S. Const. Art. III is concerned, to break or 
terminate its license agreement with the patent holder before seeking a 
declaratory judgment in federal court that the underlying patent was invalid, 
unenforceable, or not infringed). 
 2. In 1998, the Federal Circuit clarified that software is patentable when 
it is applied in such a way that yields a “useful, concrete and tangible result.”  
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 
1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert denied, 119 U.S. 851 (1999) (quoting In re Alappat, 
33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).  In addition, the State Street Court 
rejected what had become known as the “business method” exception to 
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high profile cases involving business method and software 
patents have contributed to a widely held belief that, at best, 
these types of patents are often overly broad as drafted and, at 
worst, have a deleterious impact on the marketplace.  In 
particular, cases involving the widely used BlackBerry3 device 
and eBay’s4 popular online auction site showed consumers the 
patentability, stating that “[w]hether the claims are directed to subject matter 
within [35 U.S.C. § 101] should not turn  on whether the claimed subject 
matter does ‘business’ instead of something else.” Id. at 1377. The PTO 
responded to the State Street decision by creating a new classification for 
patent applications for so-called business methods, which “encompasses 
machines and their corresponding methods for performing data processing or 
calculation operations, where the machine or method is utilized in the 1) 
practice, administration, or management of an enterprise, or 2) processing of 
financial data, or 3) determination of the charge for goods or services.”  U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, A USPTO White Paper, AUTOMATED 
FINANCIAL OR MANAGEMENT DATA PROCESSING METHODS (BUSINESS 
METHODS) 5 (defining Class 705).  In the first year following the State Street 
decision, patent filings for software/Internet business methods more than 
doubled.  See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Patent Business Methods: 
Class 705 Application Filing and Patents Issued Data, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/pbmethod/applicationfiling.htm (last visited 
Mar. 26, 2007). 
 3. In 2001, NTP sued Research In Motion (“RIM”) alleging that RIM’s 
BlackBerry service infringed its business method patents broadly directed to 
wireless e-mail.  NTP won the case and was granted an injunction barring 
RIM from selling its BlackBerry device and service in the United States.  NTP, 
Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26837, at *5 (E.D. Va. 
Aug. 5, 2003).  The injunction was stayed pending RIM’s appeals.  Id.  The 
Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s finding of patent infringement, 
despite RIM’s claim that it was not infringing NTP’s patents because a critical 
step of the BlackBerry service was not located in the United States.  NTP, Inc. 
v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  RIM filed a 
petition for certiorari on this issue, which the Supreme Court rejected in early 
2006.  Research In Motion, Ltd. v. NTP, Inc., 126 U.S. 1174 (2006).  The 
BlackBerry case made headlines largely because of its potential to impact the 
public – had the injunction been imposed, it would have affected the 
approximately 4.3 million BlackBerry customers in the United States.  See 
Grace Wong, Setback for BlackBerry Maker, CNNMONEY.COM, Jan. 23, 2006, 
http://money.cnn.com/2006/01/23/technology/rim/index.htm.  BlackBerry users 
breathed a collective sigh of relief when the parties ultimately settled for 
$612.5 million.  See Rob Kelley, BlackBerry Maker, NTP Ink $612 Million 
Settlement, CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 3, 2006, 
http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/03/technology/rimm_ntp/index.htm. 
 4. In 2001, a small company called MercExchange sued eBay, alleging 
that eBay’s “Buy It Now” feature (which allows buyers to forgo the auction and 
buy an item for a set price) infringed two of MercExchange’s business method 
patents.  In 2003, eBay was found to have infringed the patents, but the 
district court did not impose an injunction, noting that MercExchange did not 
practice the patents and was willing to license.  MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, 
Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2003).  On appeal, the Federal Circuit 
overturned the decision to not impose the injunction and held that, absent 
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potential for patent litigation to adversely affect their daily 
lives. 
 Overly broad patents are a valid source of concern, as they 
undermine the quid pro quo bargain underlying the patent 
system, whereby the patentee agrees to publicly disclose what 
it is that he claims to have invented in exchange for exclusive 
rights to exploit the invention.5  The government’s patent grant 
is intended to extend only to the inventive subject matter that 
the patentee has disclosed – simply put, a patentee is not 
entitled to a patent for that which it did not invent and disclose 
to the public in the patent document.6  Yet, if patent claims are 
afforded overly broad constructions without regard to whether 
the patentee has complied with its statutory disclosure 
obligations, the patentee’s patent coverage may exceed what 
was actually invented and disclosed. 
The patentee’s written description defines the scope of the 
invention and, therefore, is critical in determining whether the 
patentee has a right to exclude others from exploiting the full 
breadth of the claims as written, and as the patentee proposes 
that they be construed.  The written description requirement, 
codified in the first paragraph of title 35, section 112 of the U.S. 
Code, demands that the patent “contain a written description of 
the invention . . . in . . . full, clear, concise, and exact terms.”7  
“exceptional circumstances,” an injunction must follow a finding of 
infringement.  401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), reh’g & reh’g en banc denied, 
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 10220 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 26, 2006).  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari, and in 2006 held that an injunction does not automatically 
follow from a finding of infringement, but that an injunction should not be 
denied simply because the patentee does not practice the patented invention.  
126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).  The Supreme Court remanded the case for further 
consideration using the traditional four-factor test for determining whether an 
injunction should be imposed.  Id. at 1841.  Like the BlackBerry case, this case 
drew headlines because of its potential to impact on the millions of people who 
use eBay’s online auction site daily. See, e.g., Nicholas Varchaver, eBay Gets 
the Blackberry Treatment, CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 28, 2006, 
http://money.cnn.com/2006/03/28/technology/ebay_fortune/index.htm. 
 5. The term “patentee” as used in this article collectively refers to any 
party with rights to an invention covered by a patent, including inventors and 
patent assignees. 
 6. Lizardtech, Inc., v. Earth Res. Mapping. Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1375 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (Lourie, J., concurring) ("The whole purpose of a patent 
specification is to disclose one’s invention to the public. It is the quid pro quo 
for the grant of the period of exclusivity. The need to tell the public what the 
invention is, in addition to how to make and use it, is self-evident. One should 
not be able to obtain a patent on what one has not disclosed to the public."). 
 7. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2000). 
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This conclusory statutory language begs the question of what 
the patentee must do to fulfill the written description 
requirement.  While the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has 
indicated that the “purpose of the description requirement is ‘to 
ensure that the inventor had possession’” of the invention, the 
concept of possession often gets lost in the claim construction 
shuffle.8 
Under current canons of claim construction, the analysis 
focuses on the so-called “ordinary meaning” of a patent claim 
term to a hypothetical person of ordinary skill in the art, rather 
than what the patentee actually conceived, reduced to practice, 
and disclosed to the public.  The system provides an incentive 
for patentees to draft claims that encompass more subject 
matter than what they actually possessed at the time of filing, 
either by adding a specific limitation that is unsupported by the 
written description, or by using overly broad claim language 
when, in fact, the original disclosure describes something much 
narrower.  The patentee’s overly broad construction will often 
prevail, unless the alleged infringer can prove “an intentional 
disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope,” or that patentee used 
a “special definition . . . that differs from the meaning [a claim 
term] would otherwise possess.”9  This standard further 
incentivizes patentees to be vague in describing their invention, 
lest their words be interpreted to be a “clear disavowal” or 
“special definition[.]”10  Thus, in all but these most obvious 
cases, the alleged infringer is left to fight an uphill battle to 
prove that the patentee’s written description does not support 
the claim construction that the patentee has proposed. 
Placing such a heavy burden on the alleged infringer is 
misguided.  The patentee’s right to exclude extends only to the 
invention that has been described in “full, clear, concise, and 
exact terms.”11  Stated differently, others are entitled – indeed, 
encouraged – to participate in conduct that falls outside the 
 
 8. Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting In re 
Edwards, 568 F. 2d 1349, 1351-52 (C.C.P.A. 1978)), cert denied, 525 U.S. 1141 
(1999); In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 592 n.4 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (“[T]he ‘essential 
goal’ of the description of the invention requirement is to clearly convey the 
information that an applicant has invented the subject matter which is 
claimed”), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1964 (1978). 
 9. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), 
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006). 
 10. Id. 
 11. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2000). 
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scope of what has been fully, clearly, concisely, and exactly 
defined.  A claim construction system that allows a patentee to 
benefit from a vague, overly broad, or otherwise poorly drafted 
written description threatens to destabilize the patent system 
by giving the patentee more than it bargained for. 
This Article proposes that this risk could be diminished by 
a moderate shift in the application of the written description 
requirement.  Rather than continuing to perpetuate the fallacy 
that claim construction and compliance with the written 
description requirement are separate inquiries, courts should 
evaluate written description compliance in connection with 
claim construction.  Specifically, courts should place the initial 
burden on the patentee – the party typically urging the broader 
claim construction – to demonstrate that the invention’s 
written description supports the patentee’s proposed claim 
construction.  This approach would bring the scope of the 
patentee’s rights into better alignment with what the patentee 
actually invented – something that would bring much needed 
clarity and predictability to the patent system.  As Judge 
Lourie of the Federal Circuit observed in a 2006 opinion, “[o]ne 
does not receive entitlement to a period of exclusivity for what 
one has not disclosed to the public.”12  Judge Newman recently 
expressed a similar sentiment: “We should speak en banc to 
clarify that it is appropriate, and necessary, to look at what has 
in fact been invented, prosecuted, and patented, and construe 
the claims accordingly.”13 
Part I of this Article explores the constitutional and 
statutory origins of the patent system, and demonstrates that 
requiring the patentee to show compliance with the written 
description requirement is consistent with the historical 
purpose for the patent system.  Part II traces the role of the 
written description in claim construction jurisprudence before 
and after the Federal Circuit’s 2005 en banc decision in Phillips 
v. AWH Corp.,14 which upheld the primacy of the patent 
specification as “the single best guide to the meaning of a 
 12. Lizardtech, 433 F.3d at  1375 (Lourie, J., concurring). 
 13. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1042 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 5453, 
75 U.S.L.W. 3609 (U.S. May 14, 2007). 
 14. 415 F.3d 1303, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 
1332 (2006). 
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disputed term.”15  In this section, this Article argues that 
requiring the patentee to establish that the specification 
provides written support for its proposed construction of the 
claims takes the logic of Phillips one step further, and increases 
the likelihood that the patent scope will not exceed the 
invention that the patentee possessed and disclosed to the 
public at the time of filing.  Indeed, this approach has already 
been utilized (and shown to be effective) in cases where the 
patentee’s written description contains a “clear disavowal of 
claim scope” or a narrow definition that readily undermines the 
patentee’s proposal for a broad construction.  Thus, from an 
analytical standpoint, this approach is not a radical departure 
from what is already done in these clear cases.  Such an 
approach will have particular utility, however, in more difficult, 
“close call” patent disputes, because it will place the burden on 
the patentee to satisfy the court that there is written 
description support for the subject matter covered by its 
proposed construction.  Part III provides guidance on how this 
approach could be integrated with existing claim construction 
processes without the need for substantive changes in the law.  
In particular, courts could consider written description 
compliance in conjunction with claim construction without 
running afoul of the presumption of validity. 
The Article concludes by explaining how this proposal, if 
implemented, would further the goals of the patent system 
without compromising its values or necessitating massive 
reform.  Requiring the patentee to demonstrate compliance 
with the written description requirement would enhance the 
likelihood that the patent claims would match the scope of 
what the patentee actually invented.  This approach would also 
promote efficiency and fairness during claim construction by 
placing the burden on the patentee, the party best positioned to 
know what it possessed at the time of filing, and who has an 
incentive to show that such possession is supported by the 
written description.  Finally, this approach would further 
interests outside of the claim construction context as well.  For 
example, incentivizing patentees to align their claims to their 
invention as described in the specification would lead to greater 
precision in patent draftsmanship, which would particularly 
 15. Id. at 1315 (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 
1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
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benefit the realm of software and business method patents.16  
Likewise, the certainty that compliance with the written 
description requirement will be scrutinized at the claim 
construction stage may discourage patentees from pursuing 
dubious claims of infringement. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT 
OF THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT 
The constitutional and statutory basis for a patent grant in 
the United States is based on a quid pro quo exchange between 
a patentee and the government: the patentee fully discloses its 
invention to the public in exchange for exclusive rights to the 
invention for a limited time period.17  This bargain, at least in 
theory, is pro-competitive – the patentee benefits by receiving a 
legal grant of “monopoly power,”18 which creates an incentive 
 16. Claim construction “can only be determined . . . with a full 
understanding of what the inventors actually invented . . . .  The construction 
that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the 
patent’s description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct 
construction.”  Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni,  158 F.3d 1243, 
1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
 17. U.S. patents (other than design patents) issuing after June 8, 1995 
have a twenty year term, beginning on the date on which the patent issues 
and ending twenty years from the earliest filing date of the patent application.  
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).  U.S. patents (other than design patents) that 
were already in force as of June 8, 1995, or that issued on an application that 
was filed before June 8, 1995, have a term that is the greater of the “twenty-
year term” or seventeen years from the patent grant.  Id. § 154(c).  Design 
patents have a fourteen-year term from the patent grant.  Id. § 173(c). 
 18. As used herein, references to patent “monopoly” and patentee 
“monopoly power” refer generally to the “bundle of rights” that a patent 
confers upon a patentee, most notably the exclusive rights to the invention 
disclosed in the patent and the right to exclude others from making, using, or 
selling the invention.  See, e.g., Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Genetics Inst., 52 F.3d 
1026, 1031-32 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The proprietary rights granted by any patent 
are the rights to exclude others from making, using or selling the invention in 
the United States.”) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 154, which provides: “Every patent 
shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee . . . of the right to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States.”).  Thus, 
references to “monopoly” in this Article do not refer to an economic “monopoly” 
within a strict antitrust definition.  This is because “[p]atent rights are not 
legal monopolies in the antitrust sense of the word.  Not every patent is a 
monopoly, and not every patent confers market power.”  See FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (Oct. 2003) at 2 n.8, available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (citing ROBERT L. HARMON, 
PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 1.4(b) at 21 (5th ed. 2001)). 
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for the patentee to exploit the invention in the marketplace.  In 
turn, the public benefits by receiving a detailed disclosure of a 
new invention, which can be used freely upon expiration of the 
patent, and which immediately enriches the public knowledge 
so as to spur further innovation.19 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS FOR PATENTEE MONOPOLY POWER 
The United States Constitution grants Congress the power 
to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”20  
While the language does not provide great detail, it does make 
it clear that the “exclusive right” should extend only for 
“limited times,” and only to subject matter that was the 
inventor’s discovery.  As the Supreme Court has explained: 
The patent laws “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” by 
rewarding innovation with a temporary monopoly.  U.S. Const., Art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 8.  The monopoly is a property right; and like any property 
right, its boundaries should be clear.  This clarity is essential to 
promote progress, because it enables efficient investment in 
innovation.  A patent holder should know what he owns, and the 
public should know what he does not.  For this reason, the patent 
laws require inventors to describe their work in “full, clear, concise, 
and exact terms,” 35 U.S.C. § 112 as part of the delicate balance the 
law attempts to maintain between inventors, who rely on the promise 
of the law to bring the invention forth, and the public, which should 
be encouraged to pursue innovations, creations, and new ideas beyond 
the inventor’s exclusive rights.21 
B. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT OF THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION 
REQUIREMENT 
Since the first patent law was enacted in 1790, Congress 
has acted numerous times in an effort to effectuate the quid pro 
quo contemplated by our Founding Fathers.  The Patent Act of 
 19. See, e.g., Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534-35 (1966) (“The basic 
quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting 
a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with 
substantial utility.”); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 
234 F.3d 558, 621 (Fed. Cir. 2000),(en banc) (Linn, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (“[T]he patent also is of value to the public because such 
disclosures will stimulate others to add to the sum of human knowledge 
through the creation of other inventions utilizing the lessons learned by the 
patentee”), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
 20. U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 21. Festo, 535 U.S. 722, 730-31 (2002) (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989)). 
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1790 (the 1790 Act)22 did not require patent claim(s), but did 
require the patent to include a written description of the 
invention.  Specifically, the 1790 Act required the inventor to: 
[D]eliver . . .  a specification in writing, containing a 
description . . . of [the invention] . . . which specification shall 
be so particular . . . as not only to distinguish the invention . . . 
but also to enable a workman or other person skilled in the 
art . . . to make, construct or use the same  . . . .23 
Thus, the requirement for an adequate written description 
of the invention was part of the patent laws even before the 
inclusion of a patent claim was recognized or required. 
The 1790 Act further required a patentee to demonstrate 
its possession over particular subject matter by submitting a 
“working model” of its invention with the patent application.  
This approach effectively limited the invention to what was 
actually reduced to practice, as shown in the working model.  
While a working model simplified the process of determining 
the invention literally “possessed” by the patentee, it effectively 
limited the patentee’s invention to one embodiment. 
The patent laws were amended in 1793 to require, inter 
alia, an inventor to: 
[D]eliver a written description of his invention, and of the manner of 
using, or process of compounding the same, in such full, clear, and 
exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things before 
known, and to enable any person skilled in the art or science . . . to 
make, compound, and use the same.24 
This language has been interpreted to impose two distinct 
requirements – an enablement requirement (“to enable artisans 
to make and use it”), and a written description requirement, 
which would “put the public in possession of what the party 
claims as his own invention . . . and to protect the public from 
an inventor ‘pretending that his invention is more than what it 
really is.’”25  Like its predecessor act, the Patent Act of 1793 did 
not require the patent to include a claim. 
The Patent Act of 1836 (“the 1836 Act”)26 included a 
substantially similar written description requirement, but also 
 22. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318, 321. 
 23. Id. § 2, Stat. at 110. 
 24. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3 1 Stat. 318, 321 (emphasis added). 
 25. In re Barker, 559 F.2d at 588, 592 n. 4(C.C.P.A. 1977) (quoting Evans 
v. Waton, 20 U.S. 161 (1822)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978). 
 26. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117. 
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included the first iteration of claim practice: 
[B]efore any inventor . . . receive[s] a patent . . . he shall deliver a 
written description of his invention or discovery, and of the manner 
and process of making, constructing, using, and compounding the 
same, in such full, clear, and exact terms . . . as to enable any person 
skilled in the art or science . . .  to make, construct, compound, and 
use the same; and in case of any machine, he shall fully explain the 
principle and the several modes in which he has contemplated the 
application of that principle or character by which it may be 
distinguished from other inventions; and shall particularly specify 
and point out the part, improvement, or combination, which he claims 
as his own invention or discovery.27 
The requirements for a “full, clear, and exact” description 
of the invention, and a specification of the “part, improvement, 
or combination, which he claims as his . . . invention” served 
the same purpose as a working model – to fulfill the patentee’s 
quid pro quo of public disclosure.28  Whereas a working model 
demonstrated an actual reduction to practice of the invention, 
these requirements were tantamount to a constructive 
reduction to practice.  Both served to place the public on notice 
of the patentee’s invention and corresponding right to exclude.  
Accordingly, this language paved the way for Congress to drop 
the working model requirement altogether. 
The working model requirement was officially dropped in 
the Patent Act of 1870 (“the 1870 Act”).29  The 1870 Act 
included a written description provision substantially similar to 
the language of the 1836 Act: 
[B]efore any inventor . . . shall receive a patent for his invention . . . 
he shall file in the patent office a written description of the same, and 
of the manner and process of making, constructing, compounding, and 
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art or science to which it appertains . . . to make, 
construct, compound, and use the same, and . . . he shall explain . . . 
the best mode in which he has contemplated applying that principle 
so as to distinguish it from other inventions . . . and he shall 
particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or 
combination which he claims as his invention . . . and said 
specification and claim shall be signed by the inventor and attested 
by two witnesses.30 
The main differences between this provision and the 
comparable provision in the 1836 Act is the requirement to 
“point out and distinctly claim” the invention, and the reference 
 27. Id. § 6, 5 Stat. at 119 (emphasis added). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 201. 
 30. Id. § 26, 16 Stat. at 201 (emphasis added). 
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to “said specification and claim.”  This language represents the 
first unequivocal signal in patent law showing that a claim is to 
be considered its own component of the patent, separate and 
distinct from the specification.  It was not until 1952, however, 
that the patent laws were revised and codified into substantially their present 
form, expressly requiring “at least one claim” in addition to a 
written description of the invention.31 
Although the Patent Act of 1952  (“the 1952 Act” or “the 
Patent Statute”) constituted a comprehensive revision to the 
patent laws, the 1836 and 1870 Acts’ language regarding 
written description carried over to the 1952 Act in substantially 
similar form.32  Codified in the first paragraph of title 35, 
section 112 of the U.S. Code, the written description 
requirement of the Patent Statute provides: 
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, 
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the 
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to 
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode 
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.33 
 31. Although the Patent Statute has remained substantially the same 
since 1952, that may change soon.  On April 18, 2007, the Patent Reform Act 
of 2007 (“2007 Patent Bill”) was introduced to Congress.  H.R. 1908, S. 1145, 
110th Cong. (2007).  This bill broadly resembles the the Patent Reform Act of 
2005 (“2005 Patent Bill”), which was introduced to Congress on June 8, 2005.  
H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005).  Upon introduction to Congress, the 2005 
Patent Bill was hailed as the “most comprehensive change to U.S. patent law 
since Congress passed the 1952 Patent Act.”  Congressman Lamar Smith, 
Opening Statement to the Legislative Hearing on H.R. 2795, the “Patent Act 
of 2005,” June 9, 2005.  These proposed reforms include, inter alia, changing 
the “first to invent” priority system to a “first to file” system, expanding prior 
user rights, allowing pre-issuance protests by third parties, expanding the use 
of post-issuance reexamination and opposition proceedings, eliminating the 
best mode requirement, and modifying the doctrines of willful infringement 
and inequitable conduct.  Id.  Despite the radical measures proposed in H.R. 
2795, there is no proposed change that would alter the written description 
requirement. 
 32. Note that the current language of Section 112 is the result of the 1975 
amendments to the 1952 Act.  See  DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 
7.02[4] (2005). 
 33. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2000) (emphasis added).  This paragraph has 
been interpreted to encompass three distinct, but related, requirements.  As 
the Federal Circuit has explained: 
Three separate requirements are contained in [§ 112, ¶ 1]: (1) ‘the 
specification shall contain a written description of the invention’; (2) 
“the specification shall contain a written description . . . of the 
manner and process of making and using it [i.e., the invention] in 
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The Patent Statute adopts the “particularly point out and 
distinctly claim” language of the 1870 Act, and further requires 
that “[t]he specification shall conclude with one or more claims 
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject 
matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”34 
With this statutory development in mind, the Federal 
Circuit in Phillips observed that: 
[The] “bedrock principle” of patent law that “the claims of a patent 
define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to 
exclude” . . . has been recognized since at least 1836, when Congress 
first required that the specification include a portion in which the 
inventor “shall particularly specify and point out the part, 
improvement, or combination, which he claims as his own invention 
or discovery.”35 
It is important to note, however, that the 1836 Act did not 
require the same formality of a claim that is required by the 
current Patent Statute.  Rather, the specification defined the 
metes and bounds of the claimed invention, thereby disclosing 
to the public what the patentee invented.36  While the 1870 Act 
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person 
skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same”; and (3) “the specification . . . 
shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying 
out his invention.”  In common parlance, as well as in our and our 
predecessor court’s case law, those three requirements are referred to 
as the “written description requirement,” the ‘enablement 
requirement,’ and the ‘best mode requirement,’ respectively. 
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 921 (Fed. Cir. 
2004).  See also Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 
35 U.S.C. 112, ¶1, “Written Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 
1100 ( Jan. 5, 2001) (“Although the [concepts of written description and 
enablement] are entwined, they are distinct and each is evaluated under 
separate legal criteria.  The written description requirement, a question of 
fact, ensures that the inventor conveys to others that he or she had possession 
of the claimed invention; whereas, the enablement requirement, a question of 
law, ensures that the inventor conveys to others how to make and use the 
claimed invention.”). 
 34. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
 35. See Phillips,  v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d at 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(citations omitted), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006). 
 36.  
[One] objective [of the written description requirement] is to provide 
notice to the public regarding what the inventor claims as his or her 
invention so that the public can resolve any infringement concerns.  
This objective also arose during the period when patents did not 
contain any claims.  The public therefore had to rely solely on the 
written description to determine what the inventor was claiming as 
his or her exclusive property and what actions would or would not 
constitute infringement of the inventor’s rights.  Even with the 
advent of claims, the specification still satisfies the quid pro quo 
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suggested that a claim is a separate, requisite component of a 
patent, the requirement that a patent must include “at least 
one claim” was not added until the 1952 Act. 
Thus, the disconnect often seen today between how claims 
are construed and what is described in the specification is 
unsupported by the constitutional origins and statutory 
development of the laws governing the U.S. patent system.  
Construing claims without regard to what the inventor actually 
possessed at the time of filing, as measured by the written 
description, undermines the quid pro quo bargain contemplated 
by the Constitution by threatening to provide patent monopoly 
power that exceeds the actual scope of the patentee’s 
disclosure. 
II. ROLE OF THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION IN CLAIM 
CONSTRUCTION 
A. MARKMAN V. WESTVIEW INSTRUMENTS, INC. 
The Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc.37 is often credited as having created 
the modern claim construction process.  In fact, Markman did 
little to define how courts should go about construing claims.  
Rather, the case addressed the much narrower question of 
whether judges or juries are better suited to handle claim 
construction.  The Court ultimately held that “the construction 
of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is 
exclusively within the province of the court.”38  The Court’s 
holding was ultimately driven by a policy rationale that judges 
are better suited than juries to perform the task of claim 
construction.39  The Court explained: 
disclosure to the public of the inventive subject matter in exchange for 
the grant of a limited period of exclusivity to the inventor. 
Sasha Blaug, Michael Shuster, and Henry Su, Enzo Biochem v. Gen-Probe: 
Complying with the Written Description Requirement Under U.S. Patent Law, 
21 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 97, 99 (2003). 
 37. 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 38. Id. at 372. 
 39. Id. at 388.  While this policy rationale drove the Court’s holding, there 
were other factors that further supported the Court’s determination that claim 
construction was a task for judges, not juries.  For example, the Court 
determined that the Constitution’s Seventh Amendment guarantee of a jury 
trial did not, from a historical perspective, mandate the question of claim 
interpretation to be submitted to the jury.  Id. at 381-83.  In addition, the 
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[W]hen an issue “falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard 
and a simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has 
turned on a determination that, as a matter of the sound 
administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than 
another to decide the issue in question.”  So it turns out here, for 
judges, not juries, are the better suited to find the acquired meaning 
of patent terms.  The construction of written instruments is one of 
those things that judges often do and are likely to do better than 
jurors unburdened by training in exegesis . . . .  The judge, from his 
training and discipline, is more likely to give a proper interpretation 
to such instruments than a jury . . . .40 
While Markman is often cited for the proposition that 
claim construction is a “question of law” that interpretation is 
inconsistent with the actual language of the Markman decision.  
Rather, the Supreme Court recognized in Markman that claim 
construction was not a “pristine” question of law, but rather a 
mixed question of law and fact, better delegated to the courts 
because a judge is “‘more likely to be right, in performing such 
a duty, than a jury can be expected to be.’”41  The Supreme 
Court reasoned that delegating claim construction to judges, 
rather than juries, would promote uniformity.42 
The Markman Court also emphasized the unity of the 
patent document during the “mongrel practice” of claim 
construction: “‘the patent itself . . . like other written 
instruments, . . . must be interpreted as a whole . . . and the 
legal deductions drawn therefrom must be conformable with 
Court concluded that precedent weighed in favor of the court’s “interpretive 
role” in construing the meaning of a “legal instrument” such as a patent.  Id. 
at 387-88 (“‘The duty of interpreting letters-patent has been committed to the 
courts.  A patent is a legal instrument, to be construed, like other legal 
instruments, according to its tenor . . . .’”) (quoting W. Robinson, LAW OF 
PATENTS § 732, pp. 481-83 (1890)).  The Court ultimately concluded, however, 
that “history and precedent provide no clear answers” to the question of 
whether claim construction should be delegated to judges or juries, and the 
clearest mandate came from its view that judges are “better suited” to perform 
the task of claim construction.  Id. 
 40. Id. at 388-89 (citations omitted). 
 41. Id. at 389 (quoting Parker v. Hulme, 18 F. Cas. 1140) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 
1849).  See also Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1330 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (Mayer, J., dissenting) (“The Supreme Court did not suggest . . . that 
claim construction is a purely legal question.  It held only that, as a policy 
matter, the judge, as opposed to the jury, should determine the meaning of a 
patent claim.”) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006): Cybor 
Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F. 3d 1448, 1464 (Fed.Cir. 1998) (en banc) 
(Mayer, C.J., concurring) (explaining that “the [Supreme] Court chose not to 
accept our formulation of claim construction: as a pure question of law to be 
decided de novo in all cases on appeal”). 
 42. 517 U.S. at 391. 
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the scope and purpose of the entire document.’”43  However, the 
Markman Court may have obscured this message when it later 
described the claims and the written description as “two 
distinct elements” of a patent document.44  By creating a 
dichotomy between the claims and the written description, 
without specifically delineating the role each is to play in 
construing claims, the Markman Court inadvertently sparked a 
debate that continues to rage today, and is arguably a root 
cause of the perceived failings of the patent system. 
B. POST-MARKMAN: REAFFIRMING THE PRIMACY OF THE 
WRITTEN DESCRIPTION DURING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
As explained above, while Markman answered the question 
of who decides claim construction, it did not provide guidance 
on how claim construction should be conducted.45  Thus, post-
Markman, the district courts were largely left to their own 
devices to determine the procedure and substance of claim 
construction.  A handful of jurisdictions – namely, the Eastern 
District of Texas, Northern District of California, Northern 
District of Georgia, and Western District of Pennsylvania – 
have adopted patent local rules designed to promote efficiency 
and speedy resolution of patent cases by providing, inter alia, a 
series of claim construction-related deadlines leading up to a 
claim construction (or “Markman”) hearing.  In the majority of 
jurisdictions that have not adopted patent local rules, there is 
great variation among districts and judges as to the discovery 
timelines leading up to claim construction, as well as whether 
 43. Id. at 378, 383 n.8 (quoting Brown v. Huger, 62 U.S. 305, 318 (1859)). 
 44. Id. at 373. 
 45. As the Federal Circuit explained, 
Markman does not require a district court to follow any particular 
procedure in conducting claim construction.  It merely holds that 
claim construction is the province of the court, not a jury.  To perform 
that task, some courts have found it useful to hold hearings and issue 
orders comprehensively construing the claims in issue.  Such a 
procedure is not always necessary . . . . District courts have wide 
latitude in how they conduct the proceedings before them, and there 
is nothing unique about claim construction that requires the court to 
proceed according to any particular protocol.  As long as the trial 
court construes the claims to the extent necessary to determine 
whether the accused device infringes, the court may approach the 
task in any way that it deems best. 
Ballard Med. Prods. v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 268 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001). 
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and to what extent Markman hearings are conducted. 
As a result of the lack of uniformity regarding claim 
construction at the district court level, the Federal Circuit 
experienced a flood of claim construction cases in the years 
following Markman.  Despite variation in the district courts’ 
handling of claim construction, the issue on appeal often 
presented the same underlying dilemma: how to strike the 
appropriate balance between reading the claims in light of the 
written description and prosecution history without improperly 
limiting the claims.  At the heart of this challenge was the 
question of how district courts should weigh factual evidence 
bearing on the meaning of disputed terms in order to assign 
them a legally operative meaning during claim construction. 
The Federal Circuit’s attempts to respond to this challenge 
have created more confusion than clarity.  In Cybor Corp. v. 
FAS Technologies, Inc.,46 the court created controversy when it 
held that the Supreme Court’s Markman decision was 
consistent with the concept of treating claim construction as 
“purely a matter of law” subject to de novo review.47  In 
reaching this decision, the Cybor court made the puzzling 
statement that a construing court “‘is not crediting certain 
evidence over other evidence or making factual evidentiary 
findings.  Rather, the court is looking to the extrinsic evidence 
to assist in its construction of the written document, a task it is 
required to perform.’”48  This decision has been widely 
criticized for ignoring the factual questions inherent in claim 
construction and providing no deference to a trial court’s 
determinations with respect to these factual questions.  
Importantly, eight of the twelve Federal Circuit judges agree 
that Cybor should be reviewed if the “appropriate” case 
es.49 
 46. 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 
 47. Id. at 1454. 
 48. Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F. 3d 967, 
981 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 49. In a recent case in which the Federal Circuit denied a request for 
rehearing en banc, six separate dissenting and concurring opinions revealed 
internal conflict with respect to the Cybor decision.  See Amgen, Inc. v. 
Hoescht Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1040-46 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. 
denied, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 5453, 75 U.S.L.W. 3609 (U.S. May 14, 2007).  Judges 
Michel, Newman, Rader, Mayer, and Moore all bluntly criticized Cybor.  
Judges Gajarsa, Linn, and Dyk also criticized Cybor, though seemed to be 
willing to allow for de novo review if extrinsic evidence was not considered by 
the district court during claim construction.  Id. 
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Creating further confusion were the Federal Circuit’s 
conflicting decisions in Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc.50 
and Texas Digital Systems v. Telegenix, Inc.51 regarding the 
relative weight that intrinsic evidence (i.e., the written 
description and prosecution history) and extrinsic evidence 
(e.g., dictionaries, treatises, and expert testimony) should be 
given by a court faced with the task of claim construction.  Just 
a few months after Markman, the Federal Circuit in Vitronics 
held that “intrinsic evidence is the most significant source of 
the legally operative meaning of disputed claim language.”52  In 
contrast, six years later in Texas Digital, the Federal Circuit 
suggested a different approach, holding that claim construction 
should be primarily driven by extrins
ionaries, encyclopedias, and treatises. 
As discussed in greater detail below, the Federal Circuit 
provided well-needed clarity in 2005 with its en banc decision 
in Phillips v. AWH Corp.53  In Phillips, the Federal Circuit 
explicitly rejected the Texas Digital approach and reiterated 
the Vitronics pronouncement that “the specification is always 
highly relevant to the claim construction analysis.  Usually, it 
is dispositive; it is
disputed terms.”
itronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc. 
Shortly after Markman, the Federal Circuit clarified the 
imperative role of a patent’s intrinsic evidence – especially the 
written description – in determining the proper meaning for a 
disputed claim term.  In Vitronics, the parties’ claim 
construction dispute centered on the term “solder reflow 
temperature” as used in a claim for a method for the reflow 
soldering of surface mounted devices to a printed circuit 
board.55  The asserted claim required “maintaining the 
temperature of said devices below said solder reflow 
temperature.”56  The plaintiff/patent holder Vitronics argued 
 50. Vitronics Corp., v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 51. 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert denied, 538 U.S. 1058 (2003). 
 52. Vitronics, 90 F. 3d.at 1582. 
 53.   Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
126 S. Ct. 1332 (2006). 
 54. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582). 
 55. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1579. 
 56. Id. 
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that the specification made it clear that the term meant “the 
temperature reached by the solder during the period it is 
reflowing during the final stages of the soldering process,” and 
not, as the accused infringer Conceptronics contended, the 
“liquidus temperature” (i.e., t
er first begins to melt.”).57 
In holding that Conceptronics did not infringe the patent, 
the district court adopted Conceptronics’ proposed construction 
based on extrinsic evidence, particularly expert testimony that 
“solder reflow temperature” meant the same thing as “liquidus 
temperature.”58  The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, 
condemning the district court’s reliance on extrinsic evidence to 
contradict the unambiguous support in the intrinsic evidence 
for Vitronics’ proposed construction.  The court explained that 
the “peak reflow temperature” and “liquidus temperature” were 
clearly def
nings. 
The solders described in the specification had a liquidus 
temperature around 190˚ C and a peak reflow temperature 
around 210-218˚ C.  In addition, in the description of the 
preferred embodiment, “the solder is heated to a temperature of 
210˚ C but the temperature of the devices is maintained at 
approximately 195˚ C, i.e., below the peak reflow temperature 
(210˚ C) but above the liquidus temperature (190˚C).”59  Given 
the claim’s requirement that the temperature of the devices 
must be maintained “below said solder reflow temperature,” “if 
‘solder reflow temperature’ was defined to mean liquidus 
temperature, a preferred – and, indeed, the only –embodiment 
in the specification would not fall within the scope of the p
.  Such an interpretation is rarely, if ever correct.”60 
Thus, the Federal Circuit in Vitronics examined the 
evidence that each party had offered in support of its proposed 
construction, and correctly treated Vitronics’ evidence 
preferentially.  The Vitronics Court declared that it is “well-
settled” that, in “interpreting an asserted claim, the court 
should look first to the intrinsic evidence”—namely, the patent 
claims, specification, and prosecution history — because such 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1581. 
 59. Id. (emphasis added). 
 60. Id. 
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meaning of disputed claim language.”61  The court elaborated: 
First, we look to the words of the claims themselves . . . to define the 
scope of the patented invention. . . .  [S]econd, it is always necessary to 
review the specification to determine whether the inventor has used 
any terms in a manner inconsistent with their ordinary meaning.  
The specification acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms 
used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication . . . [t]he 
specification contains a written description of the invention which 
must be clear and complete enough to enable those of ordinary skill in 
the art to make and use it.  Thus, the specification is always highly 
relevant to the claim construction analysis.  Usually, it is dispositive; 
it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.  Third, 
the court may also consider the prosecution history of the patent. 62 
With respect to extrinsic evidence, the Vitronics Court 
explained that “[i]n most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic 
evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim 
term.  In such circumstances, it is improper to rely on extrinsic 
evidence.”63  Because Conceptronics’ proposed construction was 
based on extrinsic evidence that contradicted the clear meaning 
of “solder reflow temperature” as used in the specification of 
the patent, the court rejected it in favor of Vitronics’ proposed 
construction, which comported with what was described in the 
specification. 
2. Texas Digital System, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc. 
More than six years after Vitronics, the Federal Circuit 
created confusion with its decision in Texas Digital, which 
contradicted the Vitronics court’s pronouncement that the 
specification is the “single best guide to the meaning of a 
disputed term” and instead emphasized that “dictionaries, 
encyclopedias and treatises are particularly useful resources to 
assist the court in determining the ordinary and customary 
meanings of claim terms.”64 
The Texas Digital court began with the observation that 
the “analytical focus” of claim construction is the claims 
themselves, and that the “terms used in the claims bear a 
‘heavy presumption’ that they mean what they say and have 
the ordinary meaning that would be attributed to those words 
 61. Id. at 1582. 
 62. Id. at 1582. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 63. Id. at 1583. 
 64. Texas Digital Systems, Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202 
(Fed. Cir. 2002), cert denied, 538 U.S. 1058 (2003). 
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by persons skilled in the relevant art.”65  It advocated that a 
court should first consult extrinsic sources, such as 
dictionaries,66 encyclopedias, and treatises to determine the 
“full range” of a disputed term’s ordinary and customary 
meaning.  Then, only as a secondary step should the court 
check intrinsic evidence to “identify which of the different 
possible dictionary meanings . . . is most consistent with the 
use of the words by the inventor.”67  To the extent that more 
than one dictionary meaning is consistent, the claims should be 
construed to “encompass all such consistent meanings.”68 
While the Texas Digital court recognized the possibility 
that the intrinsic evidence could be “clearly inconsistent” with 
the dictionary definition, it stated that the “presumption in 
favor of a dictionary definition will be overcome” in only two 
circumstances: 
where the patentee, acting as his or her own lexicographer, has 
clearly set forth an explicit definition of the term different from its 
ordinary meaning . . . or if the inventor has disavowed or disclaimed 
scope of coverage, by using words or expressions of manifest exclusion 
or restriction, representing a clear disavowal of claim scope.69 
The Texas Digital approach was flawed for several reasons.  
The court’s statement that the “terms used in the claims bear a 
‘heavy presumption’ that they mean what they say”70 is both 
conclusory and nonsensical.  What the claim terms say is, of 
course, not as simple as the text of the words on the page; 
likewise, claim construction is not as simple as looking up 
definitions in a dictionary.  If it were, the Supreme Court would 
not have found it necessary to delegate the task of claim 
construction to judges.  Consistent with the quid pro quo 
bargain upon which the patent system is based, claims should 
only “mean” what was invented, and what was invented 
depends on what the patentee was in possession of at the time 
of filing, as defined by the patentee’s written description of the 
invention.  The Texas Digital approach, however, allowed 
dictionary definitions—which have no nexus to what the 
patentee possessed—to govern claim construction, unless the 
 65. 30 F.3d at 1201-02. 
 66. Where the term “dictionary” is used elsewhere in this article, it refers 
to dictionaries, encyclopedias, treatises, and the like. 
 67. Texas Digital, 30 F.3d at 1203. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1204 (citations omitted). 
 70. Id. at 1202. 
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written description contained an explicit definition that 
deviated from the dictionary definition(s), or if the inventor 
expressly disavowed or disclaimed claim scope.  This approach 
thus encouraged patentees to be vague in their written 
descriptions, and led to overly broad claim constructions.71 
In addition, the Texas Digital court’s analysis was based on 
the illogical premise that a person skilled in the art would 
attribute meaning to a disputed term based on dictionary 
definitions, rather than the patentee’s own words to describe 
the invention.  On the contrary, such a person would be 
generally familiar with the terminology employed in the patent, 
and would thus have no particular need to consult a dictionary 
for a basic definition.  Rather, a person skilled in the art would 
find guidance in the written description of the invention (and 
other intrinsic evidence) to determine the patentee’s specific 
use of the terminology in the context of the invention. 
3. Phillips v. AWH Corp. 
a. Specification Upheld as the “Most Important Guide” to Claim 
Construction 
On July 12, 2005, the Federal Circuit issued its highly 
anticipated en banc decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp.72  The 
principal issue for the court to resolve was “the extent to which 
[the courts] should resort to and rely on a patent’s specification 
in seeking to ascertain the proper scope of its claims.”73  The 
Phillips court endorsed the Vitronics pronouncement that the 
specification “is always highly relevant to the claim 
construction analysis.  Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single 
best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”74  In doing so, 
the Federal Circuit upheld the primacy of the specification 
 71. For an example of a case where the Texas Digital approach led to an 
overly broad claim construction, see the discussion of the Federal Circuit’s pre-
Phillips decision in Nystrom v. Trex Co., 374 F.3d 1105, 1112 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(following the Texas Digital to broadly construe the claim term “board”) and 
its post-Phillips decision in the same case, Nystrom v. Trex Co., 424 F.3d 1136 
(Fed. Cir., Sept. 14, 2005) (withdrawing its previous opinion in view of Phillips 
and limited the term “board” to mean “wood cut from a log”).  The Nystrom 
cases are discussed in Section II.C.2, infra. 
 72. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 73. Id. at 1312. 
 74. Id. at 1315 (citing Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronics, Inc., 90 F.3d  
1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). 
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during claim construction, and thereby rejected the 
“dictionaries first” approach taken by Texas Digital and its 
progeny. 
In particular, the Phillips court debunked the Texas 
Digital myth that a person skilled in the art would understand 
the claims by consulting a dictionary.  Rather, the Phillips 
court asserted that “[a person of ordinary skill in the art] is 
deemed to read the words used in the patent documents with 
an understanding of their meaning in the field, and to have 
knowledge of any special meaning and usage in the field.”75  
The court elaborated: 
The main problem with elevating the dictionary to such prominence is 
that it focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning of words rather 
than on the meaning of claim terms within the context of the patent.  
Properly viewed, the “ordinary meaning” of a claim term is its 
meaning to the ordinary artisan after reading the entire patent.  Yet 
heavy reliance on the dictionary divorced from the intrinsic evidence 
risks transforming the meaning of the claim term to the artisan into 
the meaning of the term in the abstract, out of its particular context, 
which is the specification.76 
Of particular concern to the Phillips court was the “risk of 
systematic overbreadth” that was posed by a claim construction 
approach that begins by consulting broad dictionary 
definitions.77  This risk is “greatly reduced” by an approach 
that instead preliminarily examines the intrinsic evidence — 
especially the patentee’s written description of the invention — 
to discern the legally operative meaning of a disputed claim 
term.78  Rather than relying on a dictionary with no 
 75. 415 F.3d at 1313 (quoting Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, 
Ltd.133 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
 76. Id. at 1321. 
 77. Id.  Note, however, that the Phillips Court recognized that 
dictionaries could have an appropriate role during claim construction.  The 
Court explained: 
judges are free to consult dictionaries and technical treatises “at any 
time in order to better understand the underlying technology and 
may also rely on dictionary definitions when construing claim terms, 
so long as the dictionary definition does not contradict any definition 
found or ascertained by a reading of the patent documents.” 
Id. at 1322-23 (quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584). 
 78. Id. at 1321. The Phillips Court recognized that the prosecution history 
was an important source of intrinsic evidence that courts should consider 
during claim construction.  “Like the specification, the prosecution history 
provides evidence of how the PTO and the inventor understood the patent . . . 
[and] was created by the patentee in attempting to explain and obtain the 
patent.”  Id. at 1317 (citations omitted).  Yet, in concluding that the 
specification carries greater relative weight than the prosecution history, the 
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relationship to the patent, the specification “‘acts as a 
dictionary’” for the patent at issue “‘when it expressly defines 
terms used in the claims or when it defines terms by 
implication.’”79 
As the Phillips court explained, regarding the specification 
as the “primary basis for construing the claims” is supported by 
precedent of the Federal Circuit and its predecessors, as well as 
the Supreme Court.80  Moreover, the court noted: 
The importance of the specification in claim construction derives from 
its statutory role.  The close kinship between the written description 
and the claims is enforced by the statutory requirement that the 
specification describe the claimed invention in “full, clear, concise, 
and exact terms” . . . [i]n light of th[is] statutory directive . . . the 
specification necessarily informs the proper construction of the 
claims.81 
b. Problems Remaining After Phillips 
Phillips was heralded as a much needed, long-overdue 
correction to the claim construction process.  By clarifying that 
the specification should be afforded greater weight than other 
types of evidence available to a court during its claim 
construction analysis, the Phillips case provided procedural 
guidance on how Markman hearings should be conducted.  
Specifically, Phillips directed district courts to pay less 
attention to extrinsic evidence, and instead focus on the 
particular manner in which the patentee has defined the term 
Phillips Court pointed out that “the prosecution history represents an ongoing 
negotiation between the PTO and the applicant, rather than the final product 
of that negotiation.”  Id.  The “final product” of the negotiation, then, 
represents the bargain that the patentee and government ultimately entered 
into, and is reflected by the actual words used in the patent to describe the 
invention. 
 79. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1321 (citing Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582); accord 
Irdeto Access., Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., 383 F.3d 1295, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (quoting Bell Atl. Network Servs., Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, 
Inc. 262 F.3d 1258, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2001)) (“Even when guidance is not 
provided in explicit definitional format, ‘the specification may define claim 
terms by implication such that the meaning may be found in or ascertained by 
a reading of the patent documents.’”); Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 
375 F.3d 1328, 1334-35 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (same). 
 80. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. Am. 
Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 452 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  See also, e.g., United States 
v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 49 (1966) (“It is fundamental that claims are to be 
construed in the light of the specifications and both are to be read with a view 
to ascertaining the invention.”). 
 81. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (citations omitted). 
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in the patent document itself —namely the claims, the written 
description in the specification, and the prosecution history — 
thus making drafting and prosecuting patent applications even 
more important to effective enforcement efforts. 
While the guidance provided by the Phillips decision was a 
step in the right direction, the outcome of the claim 
construction dispute at issue in the case illustrates that certain 
fundamental problems persist.  Indeed, the great paradox of 
Phillips is that the en banc court ultimately reversed the claim 
construction rulings of the panel and district court, despite the 
fact that these rulings were driven by the specification-focused 
procedure advocated by the en banc court.  The reversal reflects 
the uncertainty in predicting how a court in any particular case 
will strike the balance between reading the claims in light of 
the specification without improperly importing limitations from 
the specification into the claims. 
Phillips involved a patent for modular, steel-shell panels 
that are welded together to form vandalism-resistant walls for 
use in prisons.  The claim construction dispute centered on 
whether the language “further means disposed inside the shell 
for increasing its load bearing capacity comprising internal 
steel baffles extending inwardly from the steel shell walls[]” 
required the baffles to be positioned at obtuse or acute angles 
or whether they were not so limited (i.e., whether they could be 
positioned at 90-degree angles as well).82  The district court 
interpreted the claim language as a “means-plus function” 
claim format subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 6, and 
granted summary judgment of noninfringement on the basis 
that the specification limited the scope of the invention to 
baffles oriented at obtuse or acute angles.83  On appeal, a 
Federal Circuit panel disagreed that the claim language was 
written in means-plus-function format, but ultimately affirmed 
summary judgment of noninfringement because the 
specification was “‘unmistakably clear that the invention was 
limited to baffles angled at other than 90 [degrees].’”84 
Upon rehearing en banc, the Federal Circuit reversed 
because, based on its review of the specification, a person 
skilled in the art would not read the term restrictively.85  In 
 82. Id. at 1325. 
 83. Id. at 1310. 
 84. Id. (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 363 F.3d 1207, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 
2004)). 
 85. Id. at 1330-35. In a vigorous dissent, Judge Mayer (joined by Judge 
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reaching this decision, the Court dismissed the argument that 
the claim should be read restrictively because it would be 
invalid under a broader reading (i.e., a reading that includes 
90º angles).  The Court noted that, “[w]hile we have 
acknowledged the maxim that claims should be construed to 
preserve their validity . . . we have limited the maxim to cases 
in which ‘the court concludes, after applying all the available 
tools of claim construction, that the claim is still ambiguous.’”86  
The Court then cited to a number of cases standing for the 
proposition that limitations cannot be added to a claim for the 
purpose of preserving validity when the only reasonable 
construction of the claim does not include that limitation.87  
What is puzzling is how the en banc Court could have 
concluded that the only reasonable construction of “baffles” is 
one that includes 90º angles, when the Federal Circuit panel 
and the district court applied the same specification-focused 
procedure advocated by the en banc Court, and yet reached the 
opposite conclusion. 
Also puzzling is the Court’s statement that, in determining 
whether claims should be construed to preserve their validity, 
“we have looked to whether it is reasonable to infer that the 
PTO would not have issued an invalid patent, and that the 
ambiguity in the claim language should therefore be resolved in 
Newman) argues that the result in Phillips once again demonstrates the 
failings of the Federal Circuit’s treatment of claim construction as a pure 
question of law, devoid of any factual questions: 
[w]hile this court may persist in the delusion that claim construction 
is a purely legal determination, unaffected by underlying facts, it is 
plainly not the case.  Claim construction is, or should be, made in 
context: a claim should be interpreted both from the perspective of 
one of ordinary skill in the art and in view of the state of the art at 
the time of invention. 
Id. at 1332 (Mayer, J., dissenting).  As Judges Mayer and Newman colorfully 
describe it, the Phillips Court’s attempt to bring clarity to the claim 
construction procedure but failing to afford any deference to the trial court’s 
findings on the inherent factual questions “is akin to rearranging the deck 
chairs on the Titanic—the orchestra is playing as if nothing is amiss, but the 
ship is still heading for Davey Jones’ locker.”  Id. at 1334-35. 
 86. Id. at 1327 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 
898, 911 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 87. Id. (citing, e.g., Elekta Instrument S.A. v. O.U.R. Scientific Int’l, Inc., 
214 F.3d 1302, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“having concluded that the amended 
claim is susceptible of only one reasonable construction, we cannot construe 
the claim different . . . in order to preserve its validity”). 
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a manner that would preserve the patent’s validity.”88  This 
statement implies that it would only be “reasonable” to infer 
the PTO issued a valid patent in limited circumstances — 
which flies in the face of the presumption of validity that 
attaches to all patents issued by the PTO.89  Indeed, all patents 
are presumed valid and their claims are presumed to have 
written description support.90  As every patent litigant knows, 
however, the construction of key terms is often in dispute, and, 
as every judge tasked with claim construction knows, there 
may be sound arguments supporting each of the competing 
constructions.  Given that the PTO is not charged with the task 
of claim construction (and does not issue patents with any type 
of accompanying instruction regarding its understanding of 
claim scope), a construing court can never be entirely sure 
which of the competing constructions the PTO had in mind 
when it issued the patent.  What the court can be sure of, 
however, is that the PTO intended to issue a valid patent.  
While the Federal Circuit “has urged caution in construing 
claims in order to preserve their validity, no precedent or logic 
requires that when more than one claim construction is 
available, the court must choose the broader one although it 
may invalidate the claim.”91  When a court must decide 
between two competing constructions for a disputed term, and 
one construction would invalidate the claim and the other 
would not, it is “reasonable” for the court to adopt the 
construction that would preserve the validity of the claim.  Not 
only would it be “reasonable to infer that the PTO would not 
have issued an invalid patent”92 in such a case, it would be 
unreasonable to do otherwise, given the presumption of 
validity. 
 88. Id. at 1327. 
 89. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039, 1042 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J., dissenting),  cert. denied, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 5453, 
75 U.S.L.W. 3609 (U.S. May 14, 2007). 
 92. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327. 
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C. INTEGRATING WRITTEN DESCRIPTION AND CLAIM 
CONSTRUCTION ANALYSES IS EVOLUTIONARY, NOT 
REVOLUTIONARY 
1. Pre-Phillips Cases 
The Federal Circuit’s Phillips decision affirmed the written 
description as the primary guide to interpreting the meaning of 
disputed claim language, thus making it less likely that a 
patentee will be able to exploit the claim construction process 
to obtain a dictionary-based construction for a claim term that 
vastly exceeds the scope of what the patentee’s written 
description actually disclosed.  While the danger of overbreadth 
was reduced by this holding, more can and should be done by 
the courts in order to alleviate the risk of giving “patent 
monopoly power” in excess of what the patentee actually 
possessed and disclosed at the time of filing.  In particular, the 
Federal Circuit should take the logic of Phillips one step 
further, and require the patentee to demonstrate that its 
proposed construction complies with the written description 
requirement. 
Analytically, this proposal is not a radical departure from 
the approach taken by the Federal Circuit in pre-Phillips cases 
where the specification’s inclusion of an explicit definition or a 
“clear disavowal of claim scope” make it obvious that the 
patentee’s proposed construction lacks written description 
support.93  For example, in Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. 
Co.,94 the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment of 
noninfringement based the patentee’s inability to show that its 
broad construction of the term “water-soluble polydextrose” was 
supported by the written description.95  The patents at issue 
were directed to the process of remedying the bitter taste 
produced by polydextrose by passing it through an ion-
exchange resin.96  The written description explained that the 
bitter taste was due to the use of citric acid in the process, 
causing remnant citric acid to be bound to the product.97  The 
 93. Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1204 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002). 
 94. 224 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 95. Cultor Corp. v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 224 F. 3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 96. Id. at 1329-30. 
 97. Id. at 1330. 
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written description also provided an express definition for the 
term “water-soluble polydextrose”: “[a]s used herein, the 
expression ‘water-soluble polydextrose’. . . specifically refers to 
the water-soluble polydextrose prepared by melting and 
heating dextrose . . . in the presence of a catalytic amount . . . of 
citric acid.”98  Although the asserted claims said nothing of 
citric acid, the alleged infringer argued that the specification 
limited the term “water-soluble polydextrose” to “polydextrose 
produced with citric acid as a catalyst.”99  The district court 
agreed and, accordingly, entered summary judgment of 
noninfringement because the alleged infringer’s process used 
phosphoric acid, not citric acid.   
 The Federal Circuit’s decision in Bell Atlantic Network 
Services, Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, Inc.100 provides 
an example of a case in which the Federal Circuit found that 
the written description did not support the broad construction 
proposed by the patentee, even though the narrower meaning 
was not set forth in explicit definitional format.  The patentee 
alleged infringement of its patent for digital subscriber line 
(“DSL”) services.101  The district court granted summary 
judgment of noninfringement by adopting limited constructions 
of the claim terms at issue.102  The claim construction dispute 
centered on, inter alia, the “plurality of different modes” 
limitation contained in the following claim language: 
[A] second transceiver, connected to said first transceiver via said 
subscriber loop, for selectively operating in one of said plurality of 
different modes, said second transceiver transmitting or receiving said 
first channel signals at said first transmission rate on said first 
channel and transmitting or receiving said second channel signals at 
said second transmission rate on said second transmission rate on 
said second channel; and a controller connected to said first 
transceiver for selectively changing said first and second transmission 
rates.103 
 Based on an analysis of the intrinsic evidence, and in 
particular the written description of the invention, the district 
court restricted the “plurality of different modes” to the three 
modes described therein: “conventional ADSL” mode, “bi-
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. 262 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 101. Id. at 1265-66. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1265. 
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directional” mode, and “reversible” mode.104  The district court 
observed that “throughout the specification, the written 
description describes only these three modes” and, therefore, “it 
would ‘not broaden . . . the term beyond . . . the support in the 
specification, as the three modes discussed in the patent 
specification literally occupy the field of possibilities 
contemplated by the inventor.”105  The Federal Circuit affirmed 
this construction, noting the written description can “dictat[e] 
the manner in which the claims are to be construed, even if the 
guidance is not provided in explicit definitional format.”106  
Thus, according to the Federal Court’s Bell Atlantic decision, 
when a patentee uses a claim term throughout the specification 
in a manner consistent with only a single meaning, he has 
defined that term “‘by implication.’”107 
In Wang Labs., Inc. v. America Online, Inc.,108 patentee 
Wang alleged that AOL and Netscape infringed its patent 
directed to an online information system.  The parties agreed 
that the ordinary meaning of “frame” as used in the patent 
included bit-mapped display systems and character-based 
systems.  Wang argued in favor of the broad construction that 
would include both of these types of systems.  AOL and 
Netscape, which used bit-mapped systems, argued that Wang’s 
invention only described character-based systems.  The district 
court adopted AOL and Netscape’s limited construction, and 
granted summary judgment of noninfringement on that basis.  
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the 
written description only described character-based systems.   
 A representative example of the patent’s usage of the term 
“frame” follows: 
The videotext supplier electronically stores the information supplied 
by the different sources in the form of hundreds of thousands of pages 
(frames) each representing a collection (arranged, for example, in 
 104. Id. at 1266. 
 105. Id. at 1266. 
 106. Id. at 1268. 
 107. Id. at 1271 (citations omitted).  In addition, based on a reading of the 
written description, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that the 
“channels” limitation should be restricted to “an amount of bandwidth isolated 
for communications.”  Conceding that the ordinary meaning of “channel” is 
“quite broad”, the Court found that the written description “defines the first 
and second channels, by implication, as amounts of bandwidth, and thus, 
communication paths separated by frequency.”  Id. at 1277. 
 108. 197 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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rows and columns) of alphanumeric and graphic characters to be 
displayed on a cathode ray tube (CRT) at the subscriber’s location.109 
Wang argued that the display of “alphanumeric and 
graphic characters” can include character-based and bit-
mapped displays, and that the parenthetical use of “for 
example” implied that any character-based limitation is merely 
exemplary.110  AOL and Netscape contended that the use of 
“frame” in conjunction with “characters” restricted the 
invention to a character-based protocol, and that a character-
based protocol was the only protocol described in the written 
description or shown in the patent drawings.111   
 In affirming the district court, the Federal Circuit agreed 
with AOL and Netscape’s position that the written description 
supported only a character-based system.  In addition, the 
Federal Circuit noted that its conclusion was reinforced by the 
fact that Wang’s proposed broad construction would not have 
been enabled by the specification.  The inventors had testified, 
and thus it was “not disputed,” that “Wang had not been able to 
implement a bit-mapped protocol.”112  Wang argued that the 
fact that a bit-mapped protocol was not enabled by the 
specification was “irrelevant” to claim construction.  The Court 
responded: 
[T]he claims are not properly construed to have a meaning or scope 
that would lead to their invalidity for failure to satisfy the 
requirements of patentability.  Although Wang is correct that a claim 
is not invalid simply because it embraces subject matter that is not 
specifically illustrated, in order to be covered by the claims that 
subject matter must be sufficiently described as the applicant’s 
invention to meet the requirements of section 112.  This requirement 
was not met as to protocols other than character-based. 
In other words, “‘when claims are amenable to more than 
one construction, they should when reasonably possible be 
interpreted so as to preserve their validity.’”113 
 109. Id.  at 1381. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1381. 
 112. Id. at 1382. 
 113. Id at 1383 (citing Modine Mfg. Co. v. United States Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  In Digital Biometrics, Inc. v. 
Indentix Inc., 149 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 1998), plaintiff Digital Biometrics 
brought suit against Indentix, alleging infringement of its patent related to a 
system for generating digital fingerprint images.  Affirming summary 
judgment of noninfringement, the Federal Circuit found that the written 
description and prosecution history adopted Indentix’s narrow construction of 
the terms “array” and “slice data.”  Id. at 1346.  Moreover, the Court noted 
that if the broad construction was adopted, “we are not sure the resulting 
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In Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni,114 the 
Federal Circuit similarly limited the meaning of a claim term 
based on the failure of the written description to support a 
broader meaning.  The patent at issue covered an improved 
touch probe for use in the automated manufacturing and 
measurement field to check the dimensions of machined parts 
with extreme precision.  The claim term at issue was the word 
“when” as used in a claim, which provided “a touch probe . . . 
which has a sensing tip at a free end thereof, the probe 
generating a trigger signal when said sensing tip contacts an 
object and said stylus holder is thereby deflected relative to 
said housing . . . .”115  The district court narrowly construed 
“when” to mean “as soon as possible” after contact, and granted 
summary judgment of noninfringement as a result of this 
narrow construction. 
On appeal, Renishaw argued that “when” should be 
broadly construed to mean “at or after the time that” so that 
the claim would read on a claim that waited an appreciable 
amount of time before generating a trigger signal.116  The 
alleged infringer, Marposs, argued that the written description 
demonstrated a “clear intent to provide triggering as soon as 
possible after contact.”117  The Federal Circuit agreed with 
Marposs and the district court, finding that the written 
description was 
[r]eplete with references that indicate that the patentee was 
preeminently concerned with generating a trigger signal as soon as 
possible after contact . . . [and] shows that the patentee’s invention is 
directed at a machine that produces very accurate, very precise probe 
readings by maintaining tight control over the position of the stylus.  
In the context of the invention, such readings can only be obtained if 
the probe triggers very, very soon after contact.118 
The Renishaw Court was persuaded by statements made in 
the written description because, fundamentally, it represented 
claim would be enabled.”  Id. at 1348. 
 114. 158 F.3d 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 115. Id. at 1246 (emphasis added). 
 116. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320-21 (“requiring that any definition of claim 
language in the specification be express, is inconsistent with our rulings that 
the specification is ‘the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term,’ 
and that the specification ‘acts as a dictionary when it expressly defines terms 
used in the claims or when it defines terms by implication.’”) (citations 
omitted). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1251-52 (emphasis added). 
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the invention that the patentee actually possessed and 
disclosed at the time of filing: 
Ultimately, the interpretation to be given a term can only be 
determined and confirmed with a full understanding of what the 
inventors actually invented and intended to envelop with the claim.  
The construction that stays true to the claim language and most 
naturally aligns with the patent’s description of the invention will be, 
in the end, the correct construction.119 
As these cases show, and as the Federal Circuit confirmed 
in Phillips, the written description can indeed narrowly define 
the proper scope of a claim term even when an explicit 
definition is not articulated.120 
2. Post-Phillips Cases 
Because Phillips confirmed that the specification is the 
primary guide to discerning the meaning of a disputed claim 
term, post-Phillips claim construction disputes often center on 
the precise words used by the patentee in the written 
description.  Post-Phillips, construing courts are often charged 
with the task of examining the written description to determine 
whether a disputed term should be given a broad or narrow 
definition.  While it is not feasible to discuss every post-Phillips 
case bearing on the written description requirement in this 
Article, a handful of representative cases are discussed below. 
Nystrom v. Trex Co.121 is a case that particularly reveals 
the impact of Phillips because it led to two claim construction 
determinations by the Federal Circuit, one before and one after 
the Phillips decision.  In its 2004 (pre-Phillips) Nystrom 
decision (Nystrom I), the Federal Circuit followed Texas 
Digital’s “dictionaries first” approach to claim construction and 
held that the term “board”, as used in a patent relating to deck 
boards designed to shed water, should be broadly construed to 
mean “a flat piece of wood or similarly rigid material adapted 
for special use.”122  The Nystrom I court therefore rejected the 
accused infringer’s argument that “board” should be limited to 
mean boards made of “wood cut from a log.”123  The court 
reasoned that multiple dictionaries revealed that “the ordinary 
 119. Id. at 1249 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 120. Id. at 1582. 
 121. 374 F.3d 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Nystrom I), op. withdrawn by, sub’d 
op. at 424 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir., Sept. 14, 2005) (Nystrom II). 
 122. 374 F.3d at 1112. 
 123. Id. 
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meaning of the word ‘board’ encompasses both a piece of cut 
wood or sawn timber and a similarly-shaped item made of a 
rigid material.”124  However, in 2005, following the Federal 
Circuit’s en banc decision in Phillips, the Federal Circuit 
withdrew its Nystrom I opinion and reconsidered the claim 
construction issue in view of the Phillips court’s holding that 
the specification was the most important guide to claim 
construction (Nystrom II).125  The court determined that the 
prior claim construction of “board” was overly broad and that 
the written description limited its meaning to wood cut from a 
log.126  The Nystrom II court reasoned: “as explained in 
Phillips, Nystrom is not entitled to a claim construction 
divorced from the context of the written description and 
prosecution history. The written description and prosecution 
history consistently use the term ‘board’ to refer to wood 
decking materials cut from a log.” 
In another important post-Phillips case, Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. 
(f/k/a Astrazeneca Pharma. LP, et al.) v. Mayne Pharma. Inc., 127 
the Federal Circuit reversed a district court’s finding of literal 
infringement on the basis that the district court’s broad 
definition of the claim term at issue was clearly erroneous in 
view of the teachings of the specification.  The patent related to 
an improved formulation of a pharmaceutical composition used 
to induce and maintain general anesthesia and sedation in 
patients.128  The claim construction dispute centered on the 
claim term “edetate,” which the district court construed to 
mean “EDTA as well as compounds structurally related to 
EDTA regardless of how they are synthesized.”129  The district 
court explained that the specification expressly defined 
“edetate” to mean “EDTA and derivatives thereof.”130  The 
district court then broadly construed “derivatives” to 
encompass “structural analogs of EDTA as well as synthetic 
 124. Id. 
 125. Nystrom v. Trex Co., 424 F.3d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Nystrom II), reh’g 
denied, reh’g en banc denied, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 26669 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 1, 
2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1654 (U.S., Apr. 3, 2006). 
 126. Id. at 1144-45. 
 127. 467 F.3d 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 128. Id. at 1376. 
 129. Id. at 1374-75. 
 130. Id. at 1375.  EDTA is an abbreviation for ethylenediaminetetraacetic 
acid. 
NEMEC D & ZELENOCK E. Rethinking the Role of the Written Description Requirement in Claim 
Construction: Whatever Happened To "Possession is Nine-Tenths of the Law?". MINN. J.L. SCI. 
& TECH. 2007;8(2):357-408. 
2007]    RETHINKING ROLE OF WRITTEN DESCRIPTION 391 
                                                          
derivatives.”131 
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the accused infringer 
Mayne Pharma argued that the district court erred by adopting 
a broad claim construction for the term “edetate” that would 
include structural analogs as “derivatives.”132  In particular, 
Mayne contended that the proper construction of “edetate” was 
“the salts or anions of EDTA.”133  Abraxis (the assignee of the 
patents-in-suit) responded that the district court’s broad 
construction of “edetate” was proper in light of certain 
statements in the specification.134  The Federal Circuit agreed 
with Mayne, and thus rejected the broad definition adopted by 
the district court.  The Federal Circuit’s decision was based on 
its careful examination of the specification. 
The Abraxis court first considered the passage in the 
written description in which the patentee expressly defined the 
term “edetate”: 
By the term “edetate” we mean ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid 
(EDTA) and derivatives thereof, for example the disodium derivative 
is known as disodium edetate.  In general suitable edetates of this 
invention are those salts having lower affinity for EDTA than 
calcium.  Particular derivatives of use in the present invention 
include trisodium edetate, tetrasodium edetate and disodium calcium 
edetate.135 
The court noted that all of the “suitable” derivatives listed 
in this passage were EDTA salts, not structural analogs.136  
Although Abraxis had persuaded the district court that these 
EDTA salts were merely exemplary and not limiting, the 
Federal Circuit disagreed, noting that “in the context of the 
entire specification, it is evident that the listing of various 
EDTA salts defines the term ‘derivatives.’ At the very least, 
‘derivatives’ does not include structural analogs.”137  Of 
particular significance to the court was the fact that the 
patentee had experimented with a variety of chemical 
compositions that would be suitable for the invention, and 
“unexpectedly found that edetate, which is not regarded as a 
broad spectrum antimicrobial agent was the only agent that 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 1376. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 1376-77 (citing the patent specification). 
 136. Id. at 1377. 
 137. Id. 
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would meet our requirements.”138  The court explained, “[t]hat 
statement indicates that edetate possessed particular chemical 
properties that allowed it to work as an effective antimicrobial 
agent and that the term ‘derivatives’ was not intended to 
extend broadly.”139  
 Ultimately, the court concluded that the listing of EDTA 
salts as 
“[p]articular derivatives of use in the present invention,” coupled with 
the statements regarding the uniqueness of edetate as the only 
successful antimicrobial agent, and the patentees’ description of 
EDTA salts as advantageous, preferable, and “exceptional,” limit the 
term “derivatives” to EDTA salts or compounds that maintain the 
EDTA free acid structure. Those statements are inconsistent with a 
definition of “derivatives” that includes structural analogs that can 
encompass a large number of non-derivative compounds. That 
definition fails to recognize that the patentees’ discovery focused on 
the unexpected effectiveness of edetate and its salts as antimicrobial 
agents.140 
Although Abraxis was able to point to various instances in 
the specification that purported to support a broader 
construction, the court examined the overall context and 
meaning of the written description and found that narrower 
construction was justified.  For example, Abraxis cited the 
statement in the specification that “[t]he nature of the edetate 
is not critical, provided that it fulfils the function of preventing 
significant growth of microorganisms for at least 24 hours in 
the event of adventitious extrinsic contamination.”141  The 
court was unmoved by this statement, explaining 
when read in context, that statement does support a narrow 
construction.  It appears in the specification directly after the listing 
of the various EDTA salts that the patentees identified as suitable 
edetates.  Thus, the statement that the “nature of the edetate is not 
critical” only connotes that the choice of which particular agent to 
use, i.e., EDTA or any EDTA salt, itself is not of critical importance, 
as long as the agent chosen can adequately prevent microbial growth. 
Contrary to Abraxis’ suggestion, that sentence does not support a 
broad construction for “derivatives.”142 
 In addition, Abraxis cited to the patentees’ use of the 
 138. Id.(citing patent specification). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 1377-78. 
 141. Id. (citing patent specification). 
 142. Id. (emphasis added). 
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term “derivatives” in the context of silicone.143  Abraxis argued 
that the specification identifies “dimethicone” and 
“simethicone” as “silicone derivative[s],” which are structural 
analogs of silicone.  Abraxis argued that using the term in the 
context of silicone to broadly describe a class of antifoaming 
agents supports a broader definition for “derivatives” in the 
context of “edetate.”144  Importantly, the court disagreed: 
[t]hat term was used to describe a general class of antifoaming agents 
as disclosed in another patent.  That is far removed from the pointed 
discussion in the specification identifying the “derivatives” of 
“edetate.”  Thus, the passing reference to silicone derivatives fails to 
overcome our conclusion that the patentees narrowly defined edetate 
“derivatives” to mean EDTA and its salts.145 
The Abraxis court’s decision is important because it shows 
that the written description can compel a narrow construction 
not only where there is no explicit, narrow definition set forth 
in the specification, but also where there is no “clear disavowal” 
of claim scope or criticism of prior art on the basis of a 
particular, broader feature.  The district court, which had 
construed the claims pre-Phillips, had adopted a broad 
construction for “derivatives” largely because the “patentees did 
not disavow structural analogs from their definition of 
derivatives or criticize their usage.”146  While the district court 
later issued an opinion to the effect that its “claim construction 
was consistent with the approach suggested in Phillips,”147 the 
Federal Circuit clearly disagreed. 
The written description can compel a narrow construction 
even where there is an explicit broadening statement made 
during prosecution.  In Honeywell International, Inc. v. ITT 
Industries, Inc.,148 the patent holder Honeywell sought to 
assert patent claims in a patent disclosing a fuel filter that was 
specially made for use in motor vehicles having electronic fuel 
injection (EFI) systems.149  At issue was the construction of the 
term “fuel injection system component.”  Honeywell advocated 
a broad construction for the term, specifically contending that 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. AstraZeneca Pharms., LP v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 352 F. Supp. 
2d 403, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 147. AstraZeneca Pharms., LP v. Mayne Pharma (USA) Inc., 2005 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 26196, at *49 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 148. 452 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 149. Id. 
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the term was not limited to fuel filters as argued by the alleged 
infringer.  The district court agreed with the accused infringer’s 
narrower construction, declaring that, “notwithstanding the 
ordinary meaning or the prosecution history, the written 
description clearly limited the ‘fuel injection system component’ 
to a fuel filter, and statements in the prosecution history could 
not be used to enlarge the content of the written 
description.”150  In affirming the district court’s decision, the 
Federal Cir
[E]ven if we were to agree with Honeywell that the patentee clearly 
expressed his intention during prosecution to have the “fuel injection 
system component” limitation include components in addition to a 
fuel filter, it would not change the result in this case. As we 
determined above, the written description provides only a fuel filter 
that is made with polymer housing and electrically conductive fibers 
interlaced therein. No other fuel injection system component with the 
claimed limitations is disclosed or suggested.  Where, as here, the 
written description clearly identifies what his invention is, an 
expression by a patentee during prosecution that he intends his claims 
to cover more than what his specification discloses is entitled to little 
weight.151 
The Honeywell Court’s holding reveals the primacy of the 
written description in claim construction.  If the patentee’s 
words in the written description direct a narrower construction, 
that construction cannot be “broadened” by statements made 
during prosecution.152 
While Phillips has properly shifted the claim construction 
focus to the written description, construing courts (like the 
district court in the Abraxis case) often presume a broad 
construction (i.e., “the full effect to the ordinary and 
accustomed meaning of claim terms”) unless the accused 
infringer proves otherwise.153  This approach places the burden 
 150. Id. at 1316 (citing Honeywell International Inc. v. ITT Industries, Inc., 
330 F. Supp. 2d 865, 882-83 (E.D. Mich. 2004)) (emphasis added). 
 151. 452 F.3d at 1319 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 152. See also Biogen, Inc. v. Berlex Laboratories, Inc., 318 F.3d 1132, 1140 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (“[r]epresentations during prosecution cannot enlarge the 
content of the specification, and the district court was correct in relying on the 
specification in analyzing the claims.”) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); 
Netword, LLC v. Centraal Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (the 
claims do not “enlarge what is patented beyond what the inventor has 
described as the invention.”). 
 153. Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 989 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999) (a court must presume that the terms in the claim mean what they 
say, and, unless otherwise compelled, give full effect to the ordinary and 
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on the alleged infringer to prove a negative (i.e., that the 
written description does not support the full breadth of a 
patentee’s proposed construction).  While this burden may be 
relatively easy to shoulder in the obvious case where the 
written description is unmistakably clear that a broad reading 
is not supported (i.e., because there is an explicit narrow 
definition articulated in the specification, a clear disavowal of 
claim scope, or criticism of prior art that would encompass a 
broader definition), it becomes onerous in the more difficult 
cases in which the written description is not as clear.  The 
result is that the patentee – the party who is not only 
responsible for any lack of clarity in the written description, 
but who is also statutorily obligated to describe the invention in 
“full, clear, concise, and exact terms” – is allowed to benefit 
from vague, ambiguous, or otherwise poorly drafted 
descriptions of their inventions. 
III. PROCEDURAL IMPLEMENTATION 
Phillips neatly sets the stage for the next act, or perhaps 
the next several acts, in the development of patent law.  As 
evidenced by the opinions accompanying the Federal Circuit’s 
2006 denial of rehearing in Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion 
Roussel, Inc.,154 Phillips acted as a springboard that launched 
the Federal Circuit into an internal debate regarding the 
fact/law distinction in claim construction.  Resolution of this 
question is surely necessary.  Lurking beneath the surface of 
that debate, however, is a more elementary solution to the 
problems plaguing the patent system.  In particular, the time is 
ripe for proactive application of the written description 
requirement.  As discussed below, and in contrast to other 
proposals to reform or “fix” the patent system, the only barriers 
to taking the step proposed here are practical and 
procedural.155 
accustomed meaning of claim terms) (citing cases). 
 154. 469 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 5453, 75 
U.S.L.W. 3609 (U.S. May 14, 2007).  See also supra note 49. 
 155. See supra note 31 (discussing the Patent Reform Act of 2007 (H.R. 
1908)); see also FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE 
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (Oct. 2003), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (advocating 
changing the standard for invalidating a patent from “clear and convincing 
evidence” to “preponderance of the evidence”).  While the Patent Reform Act of 
2007 and the FTC report include a variety of intriguing and potentially viable 
reforms to the patent system, both call for major changes to the substantive 
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A. THE CURRENT PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK 
In current practice, district courts consider claim 
construction and compliance with the written description 
requirement in entirely different contexts, and are loath to 
combine the two.  Claim construction is typically handled in a 
series of briefs leading to a short hearing toward the end of 
discovery.  In complex cases, the entire issue of claim 
construction may be referred to a magistrate or special master.  
In districts where specialized patent rules are in effect, the 
parties are compelled to state their positions on claim 
construction early in the case, and work together to narrow the 
scope of their disputes.  Once the parties have agreed which 
terms are in dispute, the patent rules provide for an exchange 
of briefs on claim construction, followed by a Markman hearing. 
The defense of lack of written description, by contrast, is 
generally presented for decision either in a motion for summary 
judgment or at trial.  In either case, consideration of a written 
description defense almost invariably takes place after the 
claims have been construed.  Details of the defense will 
typically be disclosed earlier in contention interrogatory 
responses, expert reports, or in disclosures of invalidity 
contentions required by patent local rules.  However, litigants 
who attempt to inject issues of compliance with the written 
description requirement into the claim construction analysis 
are routinely rebuffed on the basis that the section 112 issues 
are premature.156  It is unclear whether the reluctance of 
district courts to grapple with written description in 
conjunction with claim construction derives from a belief that 
precedent requires treating the two inquiries separately, or 
whether it is a reflection of the general reluctance to deal with 
the often confounding issue of adequacy of written description.  
In either event, the result is that challenges to the adequacy of 
the written description are often pushed to the end of cases, 
overshadowed by other issues and defenses, and not afforded 
due consideration. 
and procedural law. 
 156. For an exemplary case, see the discussion of the Federal Circuit's dual 
decisions in the Liebel-Flarsheim case in Section III.C, infra. 
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B. WRITTEN DESCRIPTION COMPLIANCE WOULD DOVETAIL WITH 
THE EXISTING CLAIM CONSTRUCTION PROCESS 
Following Phillips, district courts now have a directive to 
take proper account of the specification in the claim 
construction process in every case.  No longer can a district 
court short circuit the analysis of the meaning of a disputed 
claim term through reliance on a dictionary definition of the 
term.  Phillips leaves no doubt that the court must analyze the 
specification and give weight to its teachings when considering 
the parties’ competing claim constructions.  As such, going 
forward a district court will inevitably have before it (and will 
have thoroughly examined) the bulk of the evidence bearing on 
the written description requirement.  It would add little burden 
on the parties to complete that record, and on the courts to 
consider additional evidence and argument, so as to grapple 
with the written description question at a time when the 
impact of the specification on the scope of the claims is already 
the analytical focus. 
In the vast majority of cases, it is the patentee’s proposed 
claim construction that pushes the boundaries of compliance 
with the written description requirement.  The patentee is also 
uniquely positioned to demonstrate what subject matter it was 
in possession of at the time the patent application was filed.  
Accordingly, the burden should rest on the patentee in the first 
instance to demonstrate that its proposed claim construction 
complies with the written description requirement. 
In districts with patent local rules, consideration of written 
description support could be integrated into the claim 
construction process with little or no change to the existing 
rules.  Taking the Northern District of California rules as 
exemplary, parties are required to exchange proposed terms 
and claim elements for construction very early in discovery, 
and shortly thereafter to exchange preliminary claim 
constructions and identify extrinsic evidence relating to claim 
construction.157  These preliminary filings would provide the 
parties with sufficient knowledge such that the accused 
 157. The Northern District of California was the first district to implement 
patent local rules.  All districts to subsequently adopt patent local rules have 
modeled their rules closely on the Northern District of California rules.  As a 
result, the sequence and timing of claim construction filings is essentially the 
same across all districts where patent local rules apply.  The patent local rules 
for the Northern District of California are available on its website, 
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/. 
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infringer could state, in the Joint Claim Construction and 
Prehearing Statement called for in Patent Local Rule 4.3, 
whether it believes the patentee’s position on claim 
construction would violate the written description 
requirement.158  Existing Rule 4.3(e) permits the parties to 
raise in this prehearing statement “any other issues which 
might appropriately be taken up at a prehearing conference,” 
and thus already contemplates that issues beyond pure claim 
construction may be raised.  If compliance with the written 
description requirement is identified as an issue in the Rule 4.3 
Statement, the patentee would then be obligated to establish in 
its opening claim construction brief (pursuant to Rule 4.5(a)) 
that its proposed claim construction would not violate the 
written description requirement.159  The accused infringer 
could respond to the patentee’s showing in its Rule 4.5(b) 
responsive claim construction brief, and the patentee could in 
turn reply under Rule 4.5(c).160 
In districts without patent local rules, the process would 
remain fluid.  District judges could require all patentees to 
establish compliance with the written description requirement 
in their initial briefs on claim construction, and then allow 
accused infringers to respond in subsequent briefs.  
Alternatively, judges could direct the parties to confer on the 
issue of whether the parties’ competing claim constructions 
raise an issue of compliance with the written description 
requirement before compelling the patentee to make a showing 
of compliance.  The same basic approach would apply to 
 158. Local P.R. 4.3 currently requires each party to submit, inter alia, a 
proposed construction for each disputed claim term, along with “an 
identification of all references from specification or prosecution history that 
support that construction, and an identification of any extrinsic evidence 
known to the party on which it intends to rely either to support its proposed 
construction or to oppose the other party’s proposed construction . . . .” 
 159. Local P.R. 4.5(a) provides: “Not later than 45 days after serving and 
filing the Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement, the party 
claiming patent infringement shall serve and file an opening brief and any 
evidence supporting its claim construction.” 
 160. Local P.R. 4.5(b) provides: “Not later than 14 days after service upon it 
of an opening brief, each opposing party shall serve and file its responsive 
brief and supporting evidence.”  Local P.R. 4.5(c) provides: “Not later than 7 
days after service upon it of a responsive brief, the party claiming patent 
infringement shall serve and file any reply brief and any supporting evidence 
directly rebutting the supporting evidence contained in an opposing party’s 
response.” 
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Markman hearings, regardless of the applicability of patent 
local rules, with patentees bringing forward argument and 
evidence on written description as part of their presentations, 
and accused infringers responding with evidence and 
argument. 
C. PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY WOULD REMAIN INTACT 
It is important to bear in mind that this procedure would 
not shift to the patentee the burden of proving validity.  Just as 
the claim construction process currently does not impose strict 
burdens of proof, there would be no defined threshold showing 
the patentee would be required to meet in order for the court to 
adopt its proposed claim construction.  District courts would 
retain the ability to adopt a claim construction even if doing so 
would likely result in invalidity based upon inadequate written 
description support.  In fact, in some cases, written description 
compliance would properly remain a question of patent validity.  
In particular, when there is a question as to whether there is 
any written description support for a particular claim 
limitation, as opposed to how much the written description 
supports (i.e., whether the written description supports the full 
breadth of the patentee’s proposed definition or something 
narrower), it makes sense to examine written description 
compliance in the context of a validity analysis.  For example, 
in Gentry Gallery v. Berkline Corp., the Federal Circuit 
invalidated certain claims for a sectional sofa because the claim 
limitation calling for a “pair of control means, one for each 
reclining seat; mounted on the double reclining seat sofa 
section . . .” for lack of compliance with the written description 
requirement because “the original disclosure clearly identifies 
the console as the only possible location for the controls.”161  In 
Gentry Gallery, the question of written description compliance 
could not have been resolved at the claim construction phase 
because a claim requiring controls “mounted on the double 
reclining seat sofa section” could not have been construed to 
mean controls mounted on the console.  It was, therefore, 
entirely proper for the Gentry Gallery court to consider lack of 
written description compliance during the validity phase, and 
nothing in this proposal would diminish a court’s ability to do 
so. 
Thus, rather than compliance with the written description 
 161. 134 F.3d 1473, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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requirement becoming a necessary prerequisite to adoption of a 
particular claim construction, the intent of this proposal is to 
compel courts and parties to consider the two issues together 
(particularly when the claim construction dispute hinges on the 
breadth to confer upon a disputed claim term), rather than 
continuing to perpetuate the fallacy that they are separate 
inquiries.  Accused infringers would remain free to challenge 
validity for lack of adequate written description, regardless of 
the outcome of claim construction.  That is to say, under the 
proposed procedure, if a court were to accept a patentee’s broad 
claim construction over the accused infringer’s objection that 
doing so would violate the written description requirement, the 
accused infringer would still have the opportunity to later 
challenge the patent’s validity by clear and convincing 
evidence.  Indeed, it is reasonable to anticipate that such a 
process would increase the frequency of written description 
challenges, as the relevant issues would be crystallized earlier 
than is currently the case, thus allowing the parties to develop 
more complete evidentiary records and better frame the issues 
for consideration in motions for summary judgment or at trial.  
Conversely, if the court were to reject a patentee’s proposed 
construction on the basis of non-compliance with the written 
description requirement, it would not be tantamount to a ruling 
of invalidity.  At most, it would be an exercise of the maxim 
that claims should, where possible, be construed so as to 
preserve their validity.162 
Although the Federal Circuit attacked this maxim in its 
decision in Phillips,163 there is nothing in the law that compels 
a court to adopt the broader of two possible claim constructions 
 162. See, e.g., Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 296 F.3d 
1106. 1114 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“It remains true that we will construe claims to 
preserve validity, if possible.”); Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface 
Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Claim language 
should generally be construed to preserve validity, if possible.”). 
 163. The Phillips Court remarked,  
While we have acknowledged the maxim that claims should be 
construed to preserve their validity, we have not applied that 
principle broadly, and we have certainly not endorsed a regime in 
which validity analysis is a regular component of claim construction.  
Instead, we have limited the maxim to cases in which “the court 
concludes, after applying all the available tools of claim construction, 
that the claim is still ambiguous.”   
415 F.3d at 1327 (citing Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 
911 (Fed. Cir. 2004)) (internal citation omitted). 
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where there is compelling evidence that doing so will render 
the claims invalid for lack of written description.  In fact, post-
Phillips developments in the Liebel-Flarsheim case that the 
Phillips court relied on to undermine this maxim exemplify the 
inefficiency of treating written description compliance and 
claim construction as wholly separate inquiries. 
In Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc.164, the claim 
construction dispute centered on whether the claimed powered 
fluid injectors required pressure jackets, even though the 
claims did not expressly recite the term “pressure jackets.”  The 
district court declined to limit the scope of the claims to fluid 
injectors with pressure jackets and the Federal Circuit affirmed 
this claim construction in 2004.  In reaching this decision, the 
court noted that “the specification in this case contains no 
disclaimer, all that Medrad can point to . . . is the absence of 
any embodiment that lacks a pressure jacket.”  The court also 
pointed out that the specification did not distinguish the 
invention from the prior art on the basis that the prior art 
lacked pressure jackets.165  In addition, there was a clear 
statement during prosecution indicating the patentee’s 
intention to cover injectors with and without pressure 
jackets.166 
While Liebel was successful in its quest for a broad 
construction, it lost the validity battle.  Medrad challenged the 
validity of the broad claims based on lack of compliance with 
the written description requirement and enablement 
requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1.  The district court 
“observed that the written description and enablement 
requirements often rise and fall together, and determined that 
the asserted claims of the front-loading patents ‘are of a far 
greater scope than [Liebel’s] specification of what it invented or 
possessed when it filed its application.’”167  In 2007, the Federal 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s invalidation of the patent 
claims because the specification did not support the broad 
construction that the patent holder had urged.168 
Because the Federal Circuit first examined the claims for 
lack of enablement and determined that they were invalid on 
 164. 358 F.3d  898 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 165. Id. at 907. 
 166. Id. at 909. 
 167. 481 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing district court ruling). 
 168. Id. at 1378. 
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that basis, it did “not need to consider the written description 
holding of invalidity.”169  Nevertheless, based on the court’s 
analysis of the specification, it is likely that the Federal Circuit 
would have reached the same conclusion as the district court 
had it considered the issue.  In particular, the court noted that 
“nowhere does the specification describe an injector with a 
disposable syringe without a pressure jacket” and, “[i]n fact, 
the specification teaches away from such an invention.”170  The 
Federal Circuit explained that  
[t]he irony of this situation is that Liebel successfully pressed to have 
its claims include a jacketless system, but, having won that battle, it 
then had to show that such a claim was fully enabled, a challenge it 
could not meet.  The motto, “be careful of what one asks for,” might be 
applicable here.171 
The Liebel case demonstrates the efficiency that could be 
gained in treating written description compliance in 
conjunction with claim construction when a court is faced with 
a broad and narrow proposed claim construction for a 
particular claim term.  Cases limiting the maxim that claims 
should be construed to preserve their validity generally involve 
situations where preserving validity through claim construction 
would involve “revis[ing] or ignor[ing] the explicit language of 
the claims,” or adding limitations in order to preserve 
validity.172  In Liebel, the court could have construed the 
claimed fluid injector to require a pressure jacket without 
revising or ignoring anything in the claims.  The court could 
have simply construed the fluid injector in view of the 
specification, which instructed that the fluid injector of the 
invention was one with a pressure jacket.  If, however, the 
patentee in Liebel had managed to obtain some claims that 
explicitly recited a fluid injector without a pressure jacket, the 
court could not have resolved compliance with the written 
description during claim construction.  Rather, such claims 
 169. Id. at 1380. 
 170. Id. at 1380. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See, e.g., Generation II Orthotics, Inc. v. Medical Tech., Inc., 263 F.3d 
1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Claims can only be construed to preserve their 
validity where the proposed claim construction is ‘practicable,’ is based on 
sound claim construction principles, and does not revise or ignore the explicit 
language of the claims.”); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum 
Co., 849 F.2d 1430, 1434 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (rejecting argument that limitations 
should be added to claims to preserve the validity of the claims). 
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would be analogous to those at issue in Gentry Gallery, where it 
was appropriate to consider the lack of written description 
compliance during the invalidity stage. 
Moreover, as discussed above, an examination of post-
Markman claim construction cases reveals that this proposal is 
not a radical departure from the approach the Federal Circuit 
has taken in previous cases where a clear issue of inadequate 
written description arises in the claim construction process.173  
Such precedent stands as proof that there is no legal barrier to 
considering written description and claim construction 
together.  Considering written description compliance 
simultaneously with claim construction in all cases where the 
claim construction dispute hinges on the appropriate breadth to 
be given to a particular claim term, would result in greater 
consistency and efficiency. 
D. THE STATUS OF WRITTEN DESCRIPTION AS AN ISSUE OF FACT 
DOES NOT PROHIBIT ITS CONSIDERATION IN CONNECTION WITH 
CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
With the Phillips Court having “left undisturbed [its] en 
banc decision in Cybor,” the Federal Circuit currently treats 
claim construction as pure question of law that is subject to de 
novo review.  As discussed above, this holding has been heavily 
criticized for being inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Markman that claim construction is not a “pristine” 
question of law, but rather one that requires the resolution of 
underlying fact questions.  In addition, Cybor has been 
criticized for the lack of deference afforded to the district courts’ 
claim construction rulings, given the amount of factual 
evidence that district courts must consider during the claim 
construction process.174  Cybor is widely regarded as 
undermining the Markman Court’s goal of uniformity, and has 
instead led to uncertainty and unpredictability, with the 
 173. See supra Section II.C. 
 174.  In his dissent in Cybor, Judge Rader denounced the majority for 
turning a blind eye to the voluminous factual evidence that district courts 
evaluate in connection with claim construction analyses:  
trial judges can spend hundreds of hours reading and rereading all 
kinds of source material, receiving tutorials on technology from 
leading scientists, formally questioning technical experts and testing 
their understanding against that of various experts, examining on 
site the operation of the principles of the claimed invention, and 
deliberating over the meaning of the claim language.   
Cybor Corp. v. FAS Tech., Inc., 138 F. 3d 1448, 1477 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
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Federal Circuit reversing the district court on the issue of claim 
construction in a substantial percentage of all cases on 
appeal.175 
If the Federal Circuit corrects its mistake by reconsidering 
Cybor – something that at least 8 out of 12 Federal Circuit 
judges have suggested a willingness to do – the path will be 
further paved for implementation of the proposal suggested in 
this article.176  That is to say, consideration of the written 
description requirement, which is considered to be a “question 
of fact”, would naturally fall within the set of fact questions 
underlying claim construction.  With Cybor reversed or 
substantially clarified, the Federal Circuit could then apply a 
more deferential standard of review to the district court’s 
finding on claim construction. 
If, however, Cybor remains the law of the Federal Circuit, 
and the Court continues to endorse the fiction that claim 
construction is a purely legal issue,177 district courts could 
nonetheless simply consider written description compliance.  
After all, Cybor, though flawed and largely unsupported by the 
very judges who brought it to life, is technically good law today 
and does not stand in the way of district courts’ consideration of 
 175. While the exact percentage is subject to some debate, most sources 
agree that the percentage is significant.  In Judge Rader’s dissent in Cybor, he 
lamented the lack of predictability on appeal due to the high reversal rate, 
noting that it “reverses more than the work of numerous trial courts; it also 
reverses the benefits of Markman I. In fact, this reversal rate, hovering near 
50%, is the worst possible.  Even a rate that was much higher would provide 
greater certainty.”  138 F.3d at 1476.  See also e.g., Dan L. Burk and Mark 
Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 53 (2005) 
(“The Federal Circuit reverses roughly a third of the claim constructions 
presented to it on appeal, a far larger percentage than its general reversal 
rate. The idea of setting out clear boundaries to warn the public of what is and 
is not claimed - the ‘notice function’ of patents that has received so much 
attention in recent years - simply isn’t working.”) (citations omitted); Kimberly 
A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2001) (finding that the Federal Circuit reverses 
district court claim constructions 33% of the time).  In a subsequent study, 
Professor Moore reported that the problem of unpredictability due to high 
reversal rate had not improved with time.  Kimberly A. Moore, Markman 
Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 231 (2005). 
 176. See supra Section II.B and accompanying discussion. 
 177. “While this court may persist in the delusion that claim construction 
is a purely legal determination, unaffected by underlying facts, it is plainly not 
the case.”  Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1332 (Lourie, J., and 
Newman, J., dissenting). 
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the written description requirement.  In fact, after Phillips, the 
written description must be considered, as it is “always highly 
relevant” – and indeed, is the “single best guide” – to claim 
construction.178  Thus, if the approach advocated in this article 
were adopted, district courts would continue to examine 
evidence of the written description, but would do so from a 
different perspective (i.e., with an eye towards whether the 
patentee’s proposed construction, if adopted, would satisfy the 
written description requirement).  Moreover, it is important to 
note that this approach would in no event require the district 
court to make an affirmative ruling on noncompliance with the 
written description requirement.  Therefore, even if this 
approach was adopted, the Federal Circuit could continue to 
review claim construction rulings de novo, with the question of 
written description compliance being subsumed within the 
legal operation of claim construction. 
CONCLUSION 
 As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he [patent] 
monopoly is a property right; and like any property right, its 
boundaries should be clear.”179  Clarity is necessary “for the 
protection of the patentee, the encouragement of the inventive 
genius of others and the assurance that the subject of the 
patent will be dedicated ultimately to the public.”180  Without 
it, “a zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation 
may enter only at the risk of infringement claims would 
discourage invention . . . and ‘the public [would] be deprived of 
rights supposed to belong to it, without being clearly told what 
it is that limits these rights.’”181 
 Though clarity is “essential” to the proper functioning of 
the patent system, the current system fosters obscurity through 
the courts’ inconsistent and unpredictable treatment of the 
written description during claim construction.  While it may be 
true that “there is no magic formula or catechism for 
conducting claim construction,” there is significant room for 
 178. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315. 
 179. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 
730 (2002) (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 
141, 150 (1989)). 
 180. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) 
(citing General Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369 (U.S. 
1938). 
 181. Id. (citation omitted). 
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improvement of the current regime.182  This article has 
recommended an approach by which the patentee is required to 
demonstrate, at the claim construction stage, that its proposed 
construction for a disputed term would comply with the written 
description requirement.  This proposal represents a moderate 
reform in the courts’ treatment of the written description 
requirement, and would go a long way in upholding the quid 
pro quo bargain underlying the patent system.  In doing so, it 
would promote clarity, predictability, and fairness in the claim 
construction process. 
 This proposal is consistent with the constitutional and 
statutory mandate that a patentee’s exclusive rights extend 
only to inventive subject matter described in “full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms.”  Under current claim construction 
practice, there is a “heavy presumption” that the patentee is 
entitled to the “full breadth” of the “ordinary meaning” of a 
claim term absent “clear disavowal” of claim scope or a contrary 
definition of the term set forth in the specification.  This 
practice seemingly ignores the fact that the patentee is not 
entitled to patent coverage for subject matter that was not 
fully, clearly, concisely, and exactly described in the 
specification.  If the patentee’s written description of the 
invention that it possessed at the time of filing falls short of the 
“full breadth” of the claim construction that the patentee has 
proposed, the patentee is not entitled to monopoly power over 
that full breadth.  Yet, current claim construction practice 
allows the patentee to unfairly benefit from incomplete, 
unclear, and imprecise descriptions of its own invention since 
such descriptions are less likely to be construed to represent 
unequivocal narrowing language. 
Perhaps a more fundamental problem with the current 
practice is its implication that a hypothetical person of 
“ordinary” skill in the art would ever understand a claim term 
to have an “ordinary” meaning removed from its meaning in 
the context of the written description.  Cases like Texas Digital 
and its progeny, which advised courts to first consult dictionary 
definitions when construing a claim in order to ascertain the 
“the full range of its ordinary meaning,” fell prey to that line of 
thinking.  In those cases, the hypothetical construct of the 
“person of ordinary skill in the art,” which was designed to 
 182. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324. 
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provide a lens through which a court should read the claims, 
has obscured the court’s analysis, rather than clarified it. 
To be sure, the Phillips court expressly rejected the 
approach taken in Texas Digital, confirming that the written 
description is “always highly relevant” to claim construction 
and is, in fact, the “single most important guide” to that 
process.  In doing so, the Court made it clear that the so-called 
“ordinary meaning” of a claim cannot be discerned by treating 
the claim as though it exists in a vacuum: “Importantly, the 
person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the claim 
term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the 
disputed term appears, but in the context of the entire patent, 
including the specification.”183  As another 2005 Federal Circuit 
decision explained, “[w]e cannot look at the ordinary meaning 
of the term . . . in a vacuum.  Rather, we must look at the 
ordinary meaning in the context of the written description and 
the prosecution history.”184  Indeed, a person of ordinary skill 
in the art is already familiar with the general meaning of the 
terminology used in the patent claims; the specific meaning of 
that terminology is informed by the written description, where 
the patentee has disclosed what was invented. 
Still, Phillips could – and should – have gone further.  
Recognizing that “there will still remain some cases in which it 
will be hard to determine” whether a broad or narrow 
construction is supported, the Phillips Court believed that 
making that determination “in the context of the particular 
patent is likely to capture the scope of the actual invention 
more accurately than either strictly limiting the scope of the 
claims to the embodiments disclosed in the specification or 
divorcing the claim language from the specification.”185  
Requiring the patentee to show that its proposed construction 
 183. Id. at 1313. 
 184. Medrad, Inc. v. MRI Devices Corp., 401 F.3d 1313, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 185. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323-24.  This approach is consistent with the 
Federal Circuit recognition that “[t]he claims are directed to the invention that 
is described in the specification; they do not have meaning removed from the 
context in which they arise.”  Netword, LLC v. Centraal Corp., 242 F.2d 1347, 
1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).  As the Renishaw Court explained, 
claim construction “can only be determined and confirmed with a full 
understanding of what the inventors actually invented and intended to 
envelop within the claim . . . [T]he claims cover only the invented subject 
matter.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni,  158 F.3d 1243, 1250 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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satisfies the written description requirement would extend the 
logic of Phillips, making it even more likely that the resulting 
construction would align with the “actual invention”.  This 
approach would have particular utility in the more difficult 
cases where it is unclear whether the full breadth of a 
patentee’s proposed construction is supported in the written 
description.  In such cases, the scale would tip in favor of a 
narrower construction – a reasonable result, given that 
constitutional and statutory requirements demand clarity and 
exactitude from the patentee in exchange for the “bundle of 
rights” a patent confers. 
 Although “possession” of a patentable invention is less 
concrete than the physical possession of tangible property, the 
old adage “possession is nine-tenths of the law” should apply to 
patents with equal force.  Requiring the patentee to establish 
written description support for its proposed claim construction 
is simply a new approach to an old idea – namely, that the 
patent grant extends only insofar as the patentee has upheld 
its end of the bargain by describing, in “full, clear, concise, and 
exact terms,” the invention it possessed at the time of filing. 
